U 253.5 .U8 1989 A32
Adkin, Mark. Urgent Fury. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.
A solid, detailed overview of the operation that most clearly
highlighted the difficulty of forming a JTF on short notice. Adkin gives an
overview of the issues, excellent maps of the battlefields, and good analysis of
the difficulties that plagued the NCA, the theater staff, and the JTF. Pages
126-144 outline the formation and crisis action planning for JTF 120.
UB 212 .A6
Allard, C. Kenneth. Command, Control, and the Common Defense. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. (See page 73 and index)
A comprehensive history of the American military command
structure. The author calls for the Services "to develop and refine a truly
unified body of joint military doctrine."
UA 23 .M23 1990
Blackwell, James A., ed. Making Defense Reform Work. Washington:
A collection of eleven essays on topics such as planning
military operations; the role of joint military institutions in defense resource
planning; and planning, programming, and budgeting, all of which composed the
final report of the Project on Monitoring Defense Reorganization, a joint effort
of the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Contains excellent background information
and thoughtful essays on the topic of defense reform.
E 745 .B57
Bolger, Daniel P. Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace.
Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.
An excellent analysis of some recent military engagements, the Mayaguez
recapture, Gulf of Sidra air engagement, Grenada invasion, and Achille Lauro
action. Demonstrates how very violent and prone to military action the
post-Vietnam period has been.
JZ 1480 .D57 2002
DiPrizio, Robert C. Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern
Iraq to Kosovo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
E 183.8 .P2 D66 1991
Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. Operation Just
Cause: The Storming of Panama. New York: Lexington Books, 1991.
Operation JUST CAUSE was probably the most meticulously planned
and well-rehearsed JTF campaign in US history; still Donnelly describes problems
with timing, rules of engagement, public affairs, post-conflict resolution, and
integration of joint forces. Superb detail at the tactical level. The
conclusions, pages 393-412, are must-read material, stressing the U.S. night
fighting advantages and the great benefit of proper training.
UA 23 .G22
Gabriel, Richard A. Military Incompetence: Why the American Military
Doesn't Win. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
Gabriel, the author of Fighting Armies: Antagonists of the
Middle East; To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics; and Operation
Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon, has, in his own
words, produced a book that "is highly critical of the American officer
corps." He reviews the Sontay raid, the Mayaguez incident, the Iran
Rescue Mission, the bombing of the Marine Compound at the Beirut airport, and
the Grenada operation. In a stinging summary, he writes that "The American
military has failed to meet the test of battle because its structure is so
deformed that it cannot produce officers--planners and leaders-- who are well
versed in the arts of war." Should be read for historical insight.
UA 830 .J63
Johnson, Maxwell O. The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in
Southwest Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-1982. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1983.
Using Congressional hearings, speeches by members of the Reagan
and Carter administrations, press releases, and interviews with Department of
Defense and Department of State officials among other sources, Dr. Johnson
reviews the "Carter Doctrine," the origin and role of the Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. He concludes that
the RDJTF was "a valuable instrument of American foreign policy and a
capable military force."
U 260 .K6 1988
Kokko, Richard W. Joint Operations Involving Marine Amphibious Forces and
Army Airborne Forces. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1988.
An examination of joint operations in the Dominican Republic in
1965 and in Grenada in 1983. The first section reviews these two operations; the
second discusses different models for force deployment; the third section
addresses command and control issues.
Lowe, Karl H. Applying Rapid Decisive Operations:
Possibilities for 2010. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2001.
DT 658.22 .O3
Odom, Thomas P. Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo,
1964-1965. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988.
(Leavenworth Paper, no. 14)
A unique analysis of joint/combined operations in central
Africa. Odom writes excellent analysis in a readable format. Pages 25-74 outline
the planning phase of Operation DRAGON ROUGE; lessons learned, highlighting the
weaknesses in planning and the chaotic nature of the command and control system
begin on page 153. Odom states, "[I]nteroperability is the overriding issue
in any combined operation." Other conclusions illustrate how "too many
bosses" and ineffective communications were major limitations.
UA 27 .R2 Q85
Quinlan, David A. The Role of the Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment Forces.
Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983.
Quinlan points out the advantages of U.S. Marine task
organization in rapid deployment operations.
UA 27 .R2 R3
Record, Jeffrey. The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military
Intervention in the Persian Gulf. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, Inc., 1981.
In his January 20, 1980, State of the Union address, President
Carter declared that "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of
the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force." As a result of this declaration, the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was formed, and charged with
"identifying, training, and planning the employment of units suitable for
rapid deployment." This monograph argues that the Rapid Deployment Force
was a "fatally flawed"...hastily thrown together collection of
existing units...suffering from inadequate strategic and tactical mobility as
well as forcible-entry capability." Record analyzes in some detail the RDF,
its weaknesses, and possible solutions.
U 260 .S82 1994
Stewart, George, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel. JTF Operations
Since 1983. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994.
A summary of recent Joint Task Force operations. Includes
summaries of 21 operations including URGENT FURY, JTF LEBANON, EARNEST WILL, LOS
ANGELES, PROVIDE TRANSITION, JTF ANDREW, RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE PROMISE, PROVIDE
REFUGE, AND SEA ANGEL. For each operation the authors describe the mission,
background, timetable, participants, command and control arrangements, lessons
learned, a summary, and references.
AD A394 687
Alberts, David S. Coalition Command and Control: Peace Operations.
Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
UB 23 .A67
Anno, Stephen E., and William E. Einspahr. Command and Control and
Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada
Invasion, Libya Raid. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1988.
A valuable study of communications
lessons learned from recent conflicts. The authors make a solid case for unity,
simplicity, and autonomy in command and control. They also offer insight into
the nature of successful communications architecture and proper communications
AD A312 172
Benfer, Dennis E. Theater Logistics: Should There Be a Joint Support
Command. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996.
U 260 .B3 1991
Bentros, Lance A. Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and
Multi-service Military Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced
Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.
"U.S. military doctrine
recognizes the need for JTFs in responding to the global commitments of the
nation. Unfortunately, Service incompatibilities and parochialism often have
hampered the joint commander's ability to get the job done."
AD A230 368
Berg, Scott A. Introduction to Command, Control and Communications (C3)
through Comparative Case Analysis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School,
AD A403 628
Bohnemann, Edward T. Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of
Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School
of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, 2002.
AD A250 546
Boy, Wayne W. Joint Task Force-Bravo--A Model for Forward Presence.
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992.
Author describes Southern
Command's JTF-Bravo as an example of a way to "transition from forward
deployment to forward presence in the face of declining resources."
AD A394 042
Carter, Ted E., Jr. Theater Air Mobility: Historical Analysis, Doctrine
and Leadership. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2000.
UB 212 .C65 1991
Coleman, John C. Tumbling "Component Walls" in Contingency
Operations: A Trumpet's Blare for Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 1991.
"Do the combatant CINCs
require a standing joint task force headquarters to provide operationally
effective and efficient command and control during contingency operations where
forced entry or other immediate commitment to combat action is required?"
AD A300 229
Colodney, Lori L. Operational Command and Control for Joint and Component
Commands: Integration or Duplication? Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of
Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College,1995.
Is current command and control
doctrine, both joint and Service, adequate to ensure interoperability for a
joint task force? The author focuses on the invasion of Grenada, and concludes
that Service component commands must plan for joint interoperability to improve
joint operational command and control.
AD A297 852
Cowan, John W. Operation Provide Comfort. Operational Analysis for
Operations Other Than War. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Dept.,
Naval War College, 1995.
AD A325 110
Davis, Dawne M. Operational Logistics in MOOTW: What Your CINC Needs to
Know. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997.
AD A217 256
Deulley, Gary W. Joint Organization: Where Do We Go after
Goldwater-Nichols? Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989.
See pages 23-26 on joint training.
"By increasing joint exposure for all officers through education and
exercises, all officers will become more familiar and eventually more effective
in the joint arena."
AD A295 932
Ferguson, Warner T., Jr. Operation Provide Comfort. A History of JTF--A
Logistical Operation. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1992.
AD A300 214
Flynt, William C., III. Broken Stiletto: Command and Control of the Joint
Task Force During Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One. Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 1995. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA300214
AD A217 341
Fondren, James W., Jr. Joint Task Force Operations in the Persian Gulf.
Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989.
A JTF under U.S. Central Command
was developed to protect eleven U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tankers from attack by
Iran. Reviews Operations EARNEST WILL and PRAYING MANTIS, and Joint Task Force
Middle East. Although military operations were predominantly Navy in July 1987,
by September of that year the joint task force was an integrated force.
AD A279 515
Foster, William F., Jr. From the Sea: Refining an Old Idea. Newport,
RI: Dept. of Operations, Naval War College, 1994.
AD A266 909
Garretson, Jeremiah F. Confronting Challenges to Jointness: Initiatives
for Joint Command and Control. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.
This paper, using C4I for the
Warrior as a jumping off point, examines operational requirements for C4I
systems. The joint task force is the logical benefactor of such support.
UB 212 .G5
Gilbert, Daniel J. Joint Task Force Command, Control, and Communications:
Have We Improved? Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff
"Is today's JTF commander
better able to command and control his force than those who executed joint
operations since the end of the Vietnam war? Have previously identified C3
problems been fixed and if not, why not?"
AD A298 174
Gillard, David W. The Joint Task Force for All Occasions: Military
Operations other than War to War Fighting. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1995.
AD A403 513
Gordon, John, IV and Bruce Nardulli. The Operational Challenges of Task
Force Hawk. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University, 2002.
AD A266 560
Grant, Nicholas P. Joint Task Force Staffs: Seeking a Mark on the Wall.
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.
This paper describes three current
approaches to preparing JTF staffs for contingency operations, those of EUCOM
and PACOM, and the Joint Staff, integrated approach.
AD A234 163
Haith, Michael E. CINC-ronization (Synchronization): The Critical Tenet
in Future Operational Art. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military
Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.
"The purpose of this paper is
to examine the critical synchronization issues confronting CINCs and Joint Task
Force (JTF) commanders in joint and combined operations. An excellent outline
and one of the most useful descriptions of joint force synchronization in print.
AD A391 765
Harmer, Todd P. Enhancing the Operational Art: The Influence of the
Information Environment on the Command-and Control of Airpower. Maxwell AFB,
AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 2000.
UB 212 .H4
Helmly, James R. Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing
Joint Task Force. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1991. 1 vol.
"In structuring contingency
forces envisioned in the future military strategy we should recognize battle and
historical experiences and organize these forces into a standing JTF."
AD A272 885
Henchen, Michael L. Establishment of a Permanent Joint Task Force
Headquarters: An Analysis of Sourcing a Command and Control Structure Capable of
Executing Forced Entry Contingency Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army
Command and General Staff College, 1993.
Henchen asks whether a permanent
joint task force headquarters should be established to "execute all U.S.
military forced entry contingency operations." He points out that it
is critical for a such a staff to have worked together on a continuing basis for
effective operations. This is most important during contingency or NOPLAN
operations where planning time is very limited. He concludes that regional
security considerations, manpower, equipment, and funding factors all combine to
make a strong case for a permanent headquarters that would then form the nucleus
of a larger staff. Benefits would be derived from the concentration of effort
into one entity, rather than a duplication of resources at each combatant
AD A326 142
Hermann, Robert and Larry Welch. Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Integration . February 1997.
AD A256 594
Hildenbrand, Marc R. Standing Joint Task Forces--A Way to Enhance
America's Warfighting Capabilities? Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced
Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College,1992.
"Reviews current procedures
for allocating forces for contingency operations, a concept for creating
standing joint task forces, and gives a comparative analysis whose purpose is to
develop a basis for determining whether current force allocation procedures or
standing joint task forces better serve future warfighting needs."
AD A 381 640
Hoefel, John S. U.S. Joint Task Forces in the Kosovo Conflict.
Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2000.
AD A323 894
Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe,
VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995.
AD A297 827
King, Robert H. NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force: Separable But Not
Separate. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Dept., Naval War College,
U 260 .K53 1995
----------. Standing Up a Joint Task Force: The Acid Test. Newport,
RI: Naval War College, 1995.
King describes the 'acid test' as
the ability or inability to stand up a joint task force "in a fast rising
crisis where forces must be immediately committed to combat." He argues
that "crisis warfighting capability is currently jeopardized by the current
approaches to JTF formation." One proposed solution is the formation of a
standing JTF headquarters in each of the regional combatant commands.
F 1567 .K5 1991
Kline, Jared A. Joint Communications in Support of Joint Task Force South
during Operation Just Cause. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 1991.
"This study analyzes the
provision of tactical and strategic communications in support of JTF-South
during Operation Just Cause, the American invasion of Panama, 20 December
1989-12 January 1990. Presents a detailed analysis of communications support
provided to a joint task force engaged in a contingency operation...."
AD A378 774
Leonard, Joseph J. Operation Allied Force: What Happened to Operational
Art. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378774
AD A249 846
Lewis, Robert D. Combined Joint Task Force Provide Comfort: What Are We
Trying to Do? What Is the Way Ahead? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1992.
What is the proper role for this
JTF? Lewis identifies national policies that the JTF "appears to
support," discusses military operations that the JTF "should be
prepared to undertake," examines the associated risks of these operations,
and finally recommends that the JTF be established as a permanent, regional
AD A272 515
Loper, Thomas C. A Candidate Functional Architecture Design for the
Detection and Monitoring Process of a Counterdrug Joint Task Force.
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1993.
"The nature of a JTF is that
of a temporary organization established from many organizations to accomplish a
specific task. By designing the JTF using a systems engineering approach of top
down decomposition, a format for the baseline requirements can be
established." Loper uses the Counterdrug Joint Task Force as a model to
describe requirements of most joint task forces.
U 260 .M18 1986
McElwee, Jerry W. Principles for Organization of Joint and Combined
Staffs. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.
The author describes the
origin and role of the military staff, General Eisenhower's organization and use
of supporting staffs, and World War II Pacific theater staff organization, and
summarizes major organizational principles culled from Generals Marshall,
MacArthur, and Eisenhower, and current corporate leaders.
AD A362 562
McGrady, E.D. and Smith, Karen. Haiti and the Future of Warfare.
Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1998. ProxyURL/Handle:
AD A286 408
Meinhart, Richard M. Joint Task Force Proven Force: An Outstanding
Success. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994.
AD A299 233
Metz, John M. Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control
Dilemma. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.
AD A379 044
Mongillo, Nicholas. Navy Integration into the Air Force-Dominated JFACC.
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000.
AD A223 416
Morgan, Terrence C. Third World Arms Proliferation and Forced Entry
Operations: Circumstances Demanding the Creation of a Standing Joint Task Force
Headquarters. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1990.
U 260 .M8 1992
Murdock, H.M. Doctrine for Combined Airborne and Amphibious Operations.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.
An interesting analysis of the
complexity of integrating airborne and amphibious operations in a joint/combined
environment. Murdock writes a succinct analysis of the command and control
difficulties in several historical examples and recommends two possible
solutions using today's theater and JTF command elements.
AD A404 767
Napper, Jennifer. Information Management in the JTF. Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002.
AD A400 764
Osborne, Craig A. Standing Joint Task Forces: Commands Now Needed.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2001.
AD A401 092
Parker, Timothy M. Making Fires Joint. Newport, RI: Naval War
U 260 .P27 1997
Partin, John W. and Rob Rhoden. Operation ASSURED RESPONSE: SOCEUR’s
NEO in Liberia, April 1996. [s.l.] History and Research Office, U.S. Special
Operations Command 
AD A348 443
Pease, Michael R. Information Superiority: "Where’s the Beef"?
Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1998.
UB 212 .R2 1991
Ramshaw, William S. Operation JUST CAUSE Command and Control: A Case
Study. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1991.
Straightforward account of the
operational planning and C2 organization.
AD A283 478
Ratliff, Leslie L. Joint Task Force Somalia--A Case Study. Newport,
RI: Naval War College, 1994.
AD A301 121
Reese, Robert J. Joint Task Force Support Hope: Lessons of Power
Projection. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College,
AD A210 929
Rodriquez, David M. Task Force Synchronization: What Is Essential?
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced
Military Studies, 1989.
This work "discusses the
importance of understanding time and space factors that are essential to the
maneuver task force's ability to synchronize offensive operations."
AD A274 327
Ross, B.A. The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations.
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.
This document examines the
establishment and structure of the joint task force headquarters in modern
contingency operations by reviewing the theoretical foundations of command and
control functions, analyzing selected historical examples of crisis response
operations, examining current doctrine, and finally making recommendations for
the best means of organizing the required joint headquarters.
AD A398 698
Row, Lisa A. A JTF Staff Structure for the New Millenium: Leaner, Faster,
and More Responsive. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1998.
AD A407 748
Sachrison, Jon E. Joint Task Forces in the 21st Century: combat Multiplier
or Force Degrader. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2002.
AD A 314 931
Sauer, Gary G. Networking the Commander and Joint Battle Staff of a Joint
Task Force. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College,
AD A250 545
Saunders, William A. Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance
and Procedures: A Critical Review." Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War
"Joint Pub 5-00.2 does a good
job addressing many of the doctrinal and procedural voids gleaned from lessons
learned in past joint operations executed by a joint task force. However, this
manual does not adequately discuss functional command organizations and
relationships. Additionally, Joint Pub 5-00.2 should be evaluated in an exercise
employing a short notice contingency scenario before its contents can be
AD A274 105
Smart, A.G. Military Support to Domestic Disaster Relief; Doctrine for
Operating in the Wake of the Enemy? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and
General Staff College, 1993.
JTF Andrew, 1992, South Dade
County and Homestead, Florida, in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. A solid analysis
of the type of operation that is not currently well understood, but that will
certainly grow in importance in the future.
AD A328 145
Straughan, Matt. Information Operations and Unity of Effort: The Case for a
Joint Interagency Information Operations Task Force. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997.
AD A341 449
Strong, Mark A. Joint Task Force XXI: SOF as Executive Agency in Military
Operations Other than War. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1997.
AD A382 095
Stuart, Robert M., II. Network-Centric Warfare in Operation Allied Force:
Future Promise or Future Peril. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000.
AD A264 283
Tegen, Carl M. Joint Communications Doctrine at the Operational Level.
Newport, RI: Dept. of Operations, Naval War College, 1993.
AD A325 240
Tindal, R.L., III. The Joint Task Force Commander Afloat: Doctrinal
Challenges. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Joint Military Operations: DOD's Renewed
Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important but Not Adequate. Washington, GAO,
This report discusses DOD's
efforts to overcome persisting interoperability problems. The focus is on system
and operational operability associated with C4I. The conclusion states that
"interoperability effectiveness could be strengthened by assigning primary
responsibility to the U.S. Atlantic Command for assessing C4I requirements for
the potential effect on joint task force operations...."
DS 318.8 .U6
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations Review Group. Rescue Mission
Report. Washington, 1980. (Also known as the Holloway Report)
AD A307 057
Walker, Daniel R. The Organization and Training of Joint Task Forces.
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1996.
AD A283 470
Weber, Bruce A. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: A New Model for Lead
Nation Command? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994.
U 260 .W674
Worley, D. Robert. Challenges to Train, Organize, and Equip the Complete
Combined Arms Team: The Joint Task Force. Alexandria, VA: Institute for
Defense Analyses, September 1998.
U 260 .W67 1996
Worley, D. Robert, Michael H. Vernon, and Robert E. Downes. Time and
Command Operations: The Strategic Role of the Unified Commands and the
Implications for Training and Simulations. Alexandria, VA: Institute for
Defense Analyses, Oct. 1996.
Arnold, S.L., and David T. Stahl. "A Power Projection Army in
Operations Other Than War." Parameters, Winter 1993-94, pp. 4-26.
An examination of lessons learned
by the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) from Operation ANDREW
RELIEF and Operation RESTORE HOPE. Concentrates on the "strategic level and
the boundary between the strategic and operational levels of Army
activities." Focuses on the themes of mission planning and deployment
challenges, the complexity of operations other than war, and the training and
preparations required for future similar operations.
Ballard, John R. and Steven C. Sifers. "JMETL: The Key to
Joint Proficiency." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995, pp. 95-98.
Barry, Charles L. "NATO's Bold New Concept - CJTF." Joint
Force Quarterly, no. 5, Summer 1994, pp. 46-54.
Blair, Dennis C. "Change Is Possible & Imperative." Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute, May 2001, pp. 46-50.
Bloechl, Timothy D. "Operation JUST CAUSE: An Application of
Operational Art?" Low-Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement,
Winter 1993, pp. 546-577.
A summary of Army doctrine,
followed by an overview of the events in Panama just before JUST CAUSE, then a
comparison of operation planning and execution with doctrine. JTF-P (Joint Task
Force Panama) is briefly discussed.
Burger, Kim. "USA Seeks to Boost Joint Task Force C2
Capabilities." Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 Aug. 2001, p. 5.
Canby, Steven L. "Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended
Consequences." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, pp.
Chelberg, Robert D., et al. "EUCOM-At the Center of the
Vortex." Field Artillery, Oct. 1993, pp. 12-16.
Signals that EUCOM's approach to
its burgeoning series of crises is the establishment of a JTF training program.
JTFs are "not only force enhancers, but a necessity for mission
accomplishment." The authors give a sound overview of the options
confronted when forming a JTF, ending with the final recommendation that the
formation of a standing JTF is not the right response. They offer a superb
overview of the JTF stand-up process within the framework of JOPES orders from
the CJCS and outline some critical staffing recommendations that include the use
of theater J-3 and J-5, J-6 and PAO personnel. Early additions of JULLS
specialists to the JTF by EUCOM is a productive idea. The article includes a
section on "Training the JTF" and another on useful conclusions,
including the idea that JTF operations start and continue at "a flat out
sprint from day one." The authors advocate an expeditionary mindset and
increased training for potential JTF staff officers.
Cittadino, John C. "C3I for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)."
Signal, Sept. 1981, pp. 31-34 +.
"Civil Disturbance Rules of Engagement: Joint Task Force Los
Angeles." Army Lawyer, Sept. 1992, pp. 30-32.
JTF Los Angeles was composed of
almost 10,000 members of the California National Guard, 1,500 Marines from Camp
Pendleton, and 1,700+ soldiers from the Army's 7th Infantry Division (Light) at
Fort Ord. This article contains the rules of engagement for this task force.
Cooke, Thomas. "NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor." Parameters,
Winter 1998/99, pp. 124-136.
Cushman, John H. "Fight as a Team." U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Jan. 1993, pp. 58-62.
should ignore Washington's roles-and-missions flummery and exercise hands-on
control of assigned forces to accomplish the mission, regardless of service
doctrine--in short, to fight as a team."
__________. "Joint Command and Control." Military Review,
July 1990, pp. 25-34.
"The U.S. military future
clearly lies in jointness; joint C2 should...be its leading wave. But joint
force interoperability, team training and all-service C2 systems today leave all
too much to be desired." General Cushman reviews the origin of this
problem, and, using a theoretical new unified command, points to C2 deficiencies
stemming from an "enduring legacy of service compartmentalization, even in
__________. "Joint, Jointer, Jointest." U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, May 1992, pp. 78-85.
Joint Task Force Provide Comfort,
commanded by MG James L. Jamerson, USAF, was formed on 7 April 1991 to bring
humanitarian relief to Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein's troops. By mid-April,
then-LTG John Shalikashvili took over command of Combined Task Force Provide
Comfort. The article describes how the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force,
along with units from the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Canada, Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Australia, and Luxembourg, worked together in
one of the most joint and combined missions assembled to date.
__________. "The New USACom: Providing the Punch." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, May 1994, pp. 96-99.
General Cushman discusses USACOM's
responsibilities for conduct joint training of JTF staffs and prepare
"joint force packages" for employment. Adaptive joint force packaging
is defined, and some of the inherent problems with this concept are raised.
Duncan, James C. "The Commander’s Role in Developing Rules of
Engagement." Naval War College Review, Summer 1999, pp. 76 – 89.
Findlay, Michael. "SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task
Forces." Special Warfare, Spring 2000, pp. 10-17.
Flores, Susan J. "JTFs: Some Practical Implications." Joint
Force Quarterly, Spring 1995, pp. 111-113.
Franke, Henry G. "Ocean Venture 93: An Overview." Field
Artillery, Oct. 1993, pp. 17-19.
Using a recent joint exercise as a
backdrop, the author gives an excellent overview of JTF formation, command
relationships, and employment. He correctly outlines the component relationships
and the role of critical joint boards. Franke stresses the importance of
coordination between echelons and offers a useful outline of JTF employment.
Goodman, Mark T. "Standing Joint Task Force: Opportunity Lost."
Marine Corps Gazette, Sept. 1998, pp. 38-39.
Gordon, John IV, et al. "The Operational Challenges of Task
Force Hawk." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 2001/2002,
Harper, Gilbert S. "Logistics in Grenada: Supporting No-Plan
Wars." Parameters, June 1990, pp. 50-63.
In an article relevant to joint
task forces from the logistics point of view, the author clearly describes
logistics requirements for operational success.
Hayes-Roth, Frederick. "Common Strategy Promises Faster Computing
Advances Implementation." Signal, Oct. 1995, pp. 64-66.
Hellwig, Frederick C. "Defending Information Operations at the Joint
Task Force." INSCOM Journal, Spring 2001, pp. 22-23.
Hollis, Patricia Slayden. "Joint Integration: The Key to Combat
Effectiveness." Field Artillery, Nov./Dec. 1998, pp. 7-10.
Interview with General Anthony
Zinni on establishing JTF Resolute Response.
Hunt, Mark. "’C4I for the Warrior’ in Action: Challenge Athena
Touches GW Battle Group." Surface Warfare, July/Aug. 1995, pp.
Laquement, Richard A., Jr. "Welding the Joint Seams." Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute, Oct. 2002, pp. 82-85.
Lenac, Randolph S. "Optimizing for the Future: Command Element
Alternatives." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1995, pp. 56-60.
Linn, Thomas C. "The Cutting Edge of Unified Actions." Joint
Force Quarterly, Winter 1993/94, pp. 34-39.
Linn states that "joint task
forces are seen today as a means of tailoring military responses to a growing
number of crises." He finishes by stating that the "integrity of
tactical units which do the fighting must be preserved with a result that the
force is more joint and combined at the top than at the bottom." Includes a
summary of recent joint task forces.
Macgregor, Douglas A. "Command and Control for Joint Strategic
Operations." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, pp. 25-33
McCarthy, James P. "Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations."
Naval War College Review, Winter 1993, pp. 9-21.
The former D/CINCEUR gives the
reader a series of axioms to guide potential commanders through pitfalls of
joint operations. After a succinct overview of the crisis action planning
process, McCarthy offers some seasoned insights into the weak points of joint
military responses, including failure by many to use the full authority given a
joint commander through the DOD reorganization Act of 1986, the importance of
communications and interactive discussions during planning, the need to fully
understand and then adapt to changes in mission (he advocates continual
estimates of the situation with the on-scene perspective being given the most
weight), the tendency not to use the best forces for the job, the tremendous
impact of the politics of any military operation, the power of CNN reporting,
the need to expect and anticipate problems, and the vital importance of momentum
in modern warfighting (he includes a recommendation for the formation of a J-5
future plans cell within JTFs). He ends with a caveat on the difficulty of
coalition operations. Overall, a thought-provoking and valuable article for any
professional involved in modern military operations.
McKearney, Terry J. "Rethinking the Joint Task Force." Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute, Nov. 1994, pp. 54-57.
Metzger, James W. "Fleet Validates Joint Mission Force
Concept." Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Jan.
2002, pp. 88-96.
Meyer, John J., III. "Joint Task Force Communications for Command,
Control and Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal,
Spring/Summer 1993, pp. 73-76.
__________. "JTF Communications: The Way Ahead." Military Review,
Mar. 1993, pp. 85-87.
Colonel Meyer argues forcefully
that existing commercial communication systems must and can be available to JTF
commanders. He suggests that the Defense Information Systems Agency take the
lead in guiding DOD investment in commercial capabilities.
Michalovich, Michail M. "Consequence Management 101: Forming and
Deploying a Joint Task Force for Consequence Management." Marine Corps
Gazette, Sept. 2000, p. 36+.
Miller, Paul D. "The Military after Next: Shaping U.S. Armed Forces
for the Next Century." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Feb. 1994,
A report on the capabilities
derived from adaptive joint force packaging and joint task forces, and the new
mission of the Atlantic Command.
Mink, Allan L. "JTF Planning Cell: Initial Response to the
Yugoslavia Crisis." Military Review, Mar. 1994, pp. 68-70.
O’Connor, Maureen. "Signal Organization: Reorienting to Support
Joint-Task-Force Operations." Army Communicator, Fall 1998, pp. 37-41.
Otis, Glenn K. "Employing the Options: How a Joint Force Commander
Views the Roles and Missions." Landpower Essay Series, Oct. 1994,
Otis, John F., Jr. "Joint Task Force Operations." Marine
Corps Gazette, Jan. 1987, pp. 24-26.
Good short primer for the division
of responsibility and requirements for a Marine Component Commander within a JTF.
This article is particularly strong in its definition of the roles of the Naval
Service component commanders (NAVFOR and MARFOR) and the more traditional
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander, Landing Force (CLF)
relationships within a JTF executing an amphibious mission. Otis makes a strong
case for always naming a MARFOR commander.
Packett, Virgil L, II, and Timothy M. Gilhool. "Diplomacy by Other
Means: JTF Aquila Responds to Hurricane Mitch. Military Review, Mar./Apr.
2000, pp. 81 – 85.
Potkovic, Troy M. "Operation Continue Hope: Maintaining Intelligence
Credibility." Military Intelligence, July/Sept. 1995, pp. 18-20.
Prueher, Joseph W. "Rethinking the Joint Doctrine Hierarchy." Joint
Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, pp. 42-45.
__________. "Warfighting CINCs in a New Era." Joint Force
Quarterly, Autumn 1996, pp. 48-52.
Roberts, Jerry A. "Ocean Venture 93 and the Joint Targeting
Coordination Board." Field Artillery, Oct. 1993, pp. 20-21.
A superb, detailed analysis of the
functioning of a critical joint board, the JTCB. Roberts breaks down the steps
in the joint targeting process and offers a useful JTCB agenda for JTF joint
fires personnel. He even suggests a clear delineation of the separation of
responsibilities in the joint fires arena. A must for JTF staff officers.
Roos, John G. "Joint Task Forces: Mix'n'Match Solutions to Crisis
Response." Armed Forces Journal International, Jan. 1993, pp. 33-39.
"U.S. military officials have
long paid lip service to the utility of joint military operations, but the idea
was repeatedly short circuited by inter-Service rivalries. It took nothing less
than the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact threat...to get leaders wearing
different uniforms genuinely interested in the unique capabilities each Service
could lay on a planning table."
Sawyer, Darren. "JTF, JIC Operations: ‘Critical Success Factors.’"
Military Intelligence, Apr./June 1995, pp. 8-12.
Shelton, David L. "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During
Operation RESTORE HOPE Somalia." Marine Corps Gazette, Feb. 1995,
Shelton, H. Hugh. "Depth and Simultaneity: Half the Battle." Military
Review, Dec. 1993, pp. 57-63.
Smith, Dan. "Doctrinal Issues in Joint Targeting." Military
Intelligence, October/December 1994, pp. 37-39.
Smith, Edward P. "NEO Operations: The SETAF Experience." Military
Review, Mar./Apr. 2000, pp. 88-89.
Smith, Edwin P. "Joint Task Forces and Preemptive Response." Joint
Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998/1999, pp. 91-99.
Stanton, Martin N. "Task Force 2-87: Lessons from Restore
Hope." Military Review, vol. 74, no. 9, September 1994, pp. 35-41.
Steele, Dennis. "Kosovo: The Task Force Commander’s
Viewpoint." Army, Sept. 1999, pp. 35-36+.
"Tactics, Techniques and Procedures from Task Force Hawk Deep
Operations: Operation Allied Force." Volume I. Center for Army Lessons
Learned Newsletter, Aug. 2000, entire issue.
See also Volume II, March 2001;
Volume III, July 2001.
Tangredi, Sam J. "Who’s Afraid of the NETF?" Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute, Nov. 1999, pp. 44-47.
"Task Force Eagle Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs):
Information Operations." Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter,
Oct. 1999, entire issue.
Valliere, John E. "Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for
Change." Parameters, Autumn 1992, pp. 69-82.
Analysis of the failed 1980
mission to rescue American hostages held in Iran. Discusses the planning, OPSEC,
and command and control issues relating to JTF 1-79. The author states that
"the ambiguities of Eagle Claw planning were its downfall. The questions
that should have been asked were not...."
Wallace, Stephen O. "Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role
of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations." Special Warfare, Jan. 1996,
Focus is on the Civil Military
Worley, D. Robert. "Joint Task Forces: Options to Train, Organize,
and Equip." National Security Studies Quarterly, Winter 1999, pp.
Yancey, Dianne. "Joint Task Force-Bravo." Military Police,
June 1993, pp. 12-14.
Headquartered at Soto Cano Air
Base, Honduras, JTF Bravo is a 1,200-person joint U.S. Army-Air Force task force
performing three missions: nation building, training, and contingency planning.
Yates, Lawrence A. "Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause-- Before and
After." Military Review, Oct. 1991, pp. 58-71.
"Joint Task Force Panama was
the organization activated by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, in
April 1988 to coordinate security operations, engage in contingency planning,
and manage tactical aspects of the crisis." Dr. Yates is also the author of
Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966.
CJCSM 3500.04C Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 1 July 2002
CJCSM 3500.05 Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, 15 April 1997
JFSC Pub 1 The Joint Staff Officer's Guide. 2000.
Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces. 10 July 2001.
Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. 14 November 2000.
Joint Pub 1-01.1 Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications. 23 April 1999.
Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12
Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations. 10 September 2001.
Joint Pub 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. 19 September
Joint Pub 3-03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. 10 April
Joint Pub 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 April 1998.
Joint Pub 3-05.1 Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for Joint
Special Operations Task Force Operations. 19 December 2001.
Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
16 June 1995.
Joint Pub 3-07.3 JTTP for Peace Operations. 12 February 1999.
Joint Pub 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations. 17 February 1998.
Joint Pub 3-07.5 JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 30
Joint Pub 3-07.6 JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 15 August
Joint Pub 3-08 Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, vols.
1 & 2. 9 October 1996.
Joint Pub 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.
Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. 9 October
Joint Pub 3-14 Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. 9 August 2002.
Joint Pub 3-16. Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. 5 April
Joint Pub 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 14
Joint Pub 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 13 April 1995
Joint Pub 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning. 25 January
Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance & Procedures.
13 January 1999.
Joint Pub 5-03.2 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II
(Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) 10 March 1992.
Joint Pub 6-0 Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations. 30
Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations . 16 June
1997. AD A407977. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997.
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS
Ellertson, Jack, and Robert Kloecker. "The Challenge of Joint Force
Training." HQ USEUCOM. Draft (7) document.
__________. "Forming the Joint Task Force: HQ USEUCOM's Approach to the
Process." 3 Nov 92. Unpublished document.
McCarthy, James P. "Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations."
U.S. European Command. 15 May 1992.
Mink, Al. "Joint Task Force Planning Cell; Developing U.S. Responses
to the Crisis in Yugoslavia." Draft document. 3 Nov 1992.
Sattler, John F. "Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Briefing."
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01102003_t01110hoa.html.. 10 Jan. 2003.
U.S. European Command. Headquarters. Joint Task Force Staff Officer's
Brain Book. 2d ed. April 1993.
Includes sections on the "USEUCOM
Approach to Forming a JTF," USEUCOM AOR, course of action development,
typical rules of engagement, command relationships.
Appendix A: SELECTED RECENT JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS
APPENDIX A: SELECTED RECENT JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS
|| Persian Gulf
|| Apr 89
|| San Salvador
|| Nov 89
|| May 92
||May 92 (NEO)
|Sea Angel II
|*Stewart, George, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel. JTF Operations Since 1983. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994.|
|JTF Full Accounting
||Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo
|JTF Shining Hope
|JTF Guardian Assistance
|JTF Full Provider
||Puerto Rico (based in North Carolina)
|JTF Guardian Retrieval
|JTF Silver Wake
||Southern European Task Force
|JTF Resolute Response
|JTF Assured Response
|JTF Provide Comfort
|JTF Restore Hope
|JTF Restore Democracy
|JTF Support Hope
|JTF Deliberate Force
|JTF Allied Force
|JTF Urgent Fury
|Task Force Hawk
|JTF Los Angeles
|CTF Horn of Africa, JTF Horn of Africa, JSOTF
Horn of Africa
|JTF Noble Anvil, Flexible Anvil, Sky Anvil
|Operation Just Cause
|Operation Sharp Edge
|Operation Earnest Will
|Operation Praying Mantis
|JTF Middle East
Please see a librarian for assistance in searching the
electronic resources found in the library.
Researched and compiled by Library Director, Joint Forces Staff College, May 2003