7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21^st Century,
by Andrew F. Krepinevich. New York: Bantam Dell, 2009.

Krepinevich tracks the paths of seven potential crises, including the collapse of Pakistan, a worldwide cyber attack, or civil unrest in China, and examines the resulting actions and counteractions of the world’s players in a not-too-distant, or unlikely, future.

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,
by David Kilcullen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Kilcullen sees today's conflicts as a complex pairing of contrasting trends: local social networks and worldwide movements; traditional and postmodern culture; local insurgencies seeking autonomy and a broader pan-Islamic campaign. The United States must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts where possible, and win them where necessary.

The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan,
by John E. Ferling. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

These vignettes, written by junior officers about their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerrillas in Afghanistan, served as a Soviet military textbook on mountain-desert terrain combat. The text continues to provide valuable lessons learned to today’s fighting forces.

Counterinsurgency,
by David Kilcullen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

David Kilcullen is recognized as one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare , and, according to Thomas Ricks, author of The Gamble and Fiasco, his influence on U.S. military thought about counterinsurgency campaigning cannot be overstated. In his most recent book, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vital topic.

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,
by David Galula. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006.

Written by a French military officer who served in World War II, China, Greece, and Algeria, this is considered the classic text on counterinsurgency. Though originally published in 1964, contemporary reviewers (Daly, Killebrew, Hammes) see great value in applying its concepts to today’s wars. Concisely written, the chapters of this short book address the nature of revolutionary war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, strategy and tactics, and a step-by-step guide to defeating the insurgents, influencing and controlling the population, and establishing political stability. For emphasis, LTC Galula cites historical examples and his own various experiences throughout the book.

Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam,
by H.R. McMaster. New York: Harper Perennial, 1998.

Dereliction of Duty is an analysis of how and why the United States became involved in an all-out war in Southeast Asia. Fully researched, based on recently released transcripts and personal accounts of crucial meetings, confrontations and decisions, it re-creates what happened and why. It also pinpoints the policies and decisions that got the United States into a quagmire and reveals who made these decisions and the motives behind them, including President Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and others.

The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008,
by Thomas E. Ricks. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.

Using hundreds of hours of interviews with military officers and on-the-ground reportage, Ricks documents the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 and examines the events that led to the launching of the surge and the beginning of a very different war.

How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle,
by Gideon Rose. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.

In this penetrating look at American wars over the last half century, Rose argues how U.S. leaders have focused almost entirely on winning the battle and ignoring the aftermath. Drawing on vast research, including extensive interviews with participants in recent wars, Rose re-creates the choices that presidents and their advisers have confronted during the final stages of each major conflict from World War I through Iraq. American leaders can and must do a better job next time around—making the creation of a stable and sustainable local political outcome the goal of all wartime plans, rather than an afterthought to be dealt with once the "real" military work is over.

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
by John A. Nagl. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Nagl argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions. He compares the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War and explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya and why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict.

The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda,
by Peter Bergen. New York: Free Press, 2011.

Peter Bergen offers a comprehensive history of the ten-year-old war and its evolution, from the strategies devised in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to the fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond. Unlike any other book on this subject, the author tells the story of this shifting war’s failures and successes from the perspectives of both the United States and al-Qaeda and its allies and provides an illuminating narrative that not only traces the arc of the fight but projects its likely future.

The Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope, 1945-1953,
by Robert Dallek. New York: Harper, 2010.

Using hundreds of hours of interviews with military officers and on-the-ground reportage, Ricks documents the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 and examines the events that led to the launching of the surge and the beginning of a very different war.

The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars,
by David H. Ucko. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2009.

David Ucko examines the Department of Defense’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to the changing strategic reality of modern warfare. He also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of conducting counterinsurgency operations: from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance – all the while continuing to stabilize conquered territory and engage with local populations.

The Next Decade: Where We’ve Been – And Where We’re Going,
by George Friedman. New York: Doubleday, 2011.

The author of The Next 100 Years now focuses on the next decade and the imminent events and challenges that will test America and the world, specifically addressing the skills that will be required by the decade's leaders. From Islam's decline to China's financial crisis, he offers a number of scenarios and predictions.

Obama’s Wars,
by Bob Woodward. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.

David Ucko examines the Department of Defense’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to the changing strategic reality of modern warfare. He also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of conducting counterinsurgency operations: from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance – all the while continuing to stabilize conquered territory and engage with local populations.

A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq,
by Mark Moyar. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

Mark Moyar assails the conventional wisdom that the key to defeating insurgents is selecting methods that will win the people’s hearts and minds. Instead, he asserts that the key is selecting commanders who have superior leadership abilities. Moyar identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and explains how the U.S. military and America’s allies in Afghanistan and Iraq should revamp their personnel systems in order to elevate more individuals with those attributes.

Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
by Greg Mortenson. New York: Viking, 2009.

In this dramatic first-person narrative, Mortenson picks up where Three Cups of Tea left off in 2003, recounting his relentless, ongoing efforts to establish schools for girls in Afghanistan; his extensive work in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan after a massive earthquake hit the region in 2005; and the unique ways he has built relationships with Islamic clerics, militia commanders, and tribal leaders even as he was dodging shootouts with feuding Afghan warlords and surviving an eight-day armed abduction by the Taliban.

Swords and Ploughshares: Building Peace in the 21^st Century,
by Paddy Ashdown. London: Phoenix, 2008.

How can it be ensured that current missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and other similar peacekeeping missions do not turn into long-term entanglements? Paddy Ashdown, a former Marine and diplomat, contends that the way to stop the big wars is to deal promptly with the small ones. In this study, Lord Ashdown investigates the successes and failures of peacekeeping operations and the lessons that have been learned, as well as the lessons that are repeatedly forgotten.

Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon,
by James R. Locher. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.

"A comprehensive account of the battle to make the GNA a reality. Skillfully bringing to life not only the players but also the issues, Mr. Locher, who was a prime mover in framing the legislation that resulted in Goldwater-Nichols, has written the definitive history of the Act."

War,
by Sebastian Junger. New York: Twelve, 2010.

Junger examines the reality of combat in this on-the-ground account which follows a single platoon through a 15-month tour of duty in the most dangerous outpost in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley.

War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age,
by Thomas Rid and Mark Hecker. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2009.

War 2.0 traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents have adapted irregular conflict to novel media platforms. It examines the public affairs policies of the U.S. land forces, the British Army, and the Israeli Defense Forces. Then, it compares the media-related counterinsurgency methods of these conventional armies with the methods devised by their irregular adversaries, showing how organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah use the web, not merely to advertise their political agenda and influence public opinion, but to mobilize a following and put violent ideas into action.

War by Land, Sea and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command,
by David Jablonsky. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

David Jablonsky explores Eisenhower’s efforts to implement a unified command in the U.S. military—a concept that eventually led to the current organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that, almost three decades after Eisenhower’s presidency, played a major role in defense reorganization under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In the new century, Eisenhower’s approach continues to animate reform discussion at the highest level of government in terms of the interagency process.

The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy and the Way Out of Afghanistan,
by Francis J. West. New York: Random House, 2011.

A military expert explores the greatest revolution in military affairs since the atom bomb—the advent of robotic warfare. Singer contends that as these technologies multiply, they will have profound effects on the front lines as well as on the politics back home.