Learning on the Job: Applying the Lessons of Recent Conflicts to Current Issues in Defense Policy
The Honorable Ike Skelton,
U.S. House of Representatives
Military leaders are often accused, usually unfairly,
of fighting the last war. It would be a
pretty poor general, however, who didn’t learn from what worked and what didn’t
work when military plans were actually put to the test. The task is to correct what went wrong and
to build on what went right without losing sight of the fact that conflicts in
the future may be quite different from those in the past. It is the premise of this article that a
careful look at significant U.S. military operations over about the past twenty
years – roughly the period the author has served in Congress – can help shape
answers to a surprisingly large number of contemporary issues in defense
policy. What follows is a brief review
of seven of these military operations, followed by a discussion of some
important lessons.
Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, April 1980
In April 1980, President Carter authorized an audacious
military operation to rescue American diplomats held hostage in Tehran since
the previous November. Although the operation ended in disaster at Desert I, it
ultimately had some salutary effects. It prompted a great deal of public soul
searching about the state of U.S. military readiness, and perhaps most
importantly, it marked a turning point in popular support for military
preparedness. The lessons of Desert I
also contributed to steps that Congress took in coming years to strengthen
special operations forces and clarify lines of command.
Lebanon, 1982-1984
U.S. Marines were sent to Lebanon in September 1982
as part of a multi-national force (MNF) in response to a worsening civil war. The failure of the MNF mission,
and the tragic loss of 241 Marines when a truck bomb was exploded at Marine
headquarters in Beirut, imposed sobering lessons on U.S. policy makers. The mission was ill-defined from the
beginning. It was not clear whether the
MNF was a traditional peacekeeping force depending for its effectiveness on
maintaining the consent of contending parties or whether it was a “peacemaking”
force empowered to compel adherence to agreements more assertively. Rules of engagement governing the conduct of
troops in the field were ambiguous, and actions necessary to protect the force
were not undertaken. As the security
situation deteriorated, it should have become apparent that the size and
composition of the force were inadequate, but decision makers failed to rethink
the nature of the mission and instead allowed the conflict to escalate
incrementally.
The outcome of the MNF mission shaped subsequent U.S.
debates about the use of military force. Lebanon was clearly at the forefront of Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger’s thinking when, in November 1984, he articulated what came to be
known as the “Weinberger Doctrine,” laying out six restrictive conditions on
U.S. military action. Weinberger’s
sharpest critic was Secretary of State George Shultz, who responded with a series of three speeches
taking issue with most of Weinberger’s conditions. Echoes of the Weinberger-Shultz exchange have been heard
frequently in subsequent debates about military operations.
Grenada, October-November 1983
Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada was planned with
virtually no advance warning and executed by diverse units with no opportunity
to train jointly before the operation began. It was not a walkover. The operation suffered from some shortcomings,
including failures that cost some lives. Intelligence was not complete. Communications were often unreliable,
particularly in coordinating air attacks and naval gunfire with ground
operations.
Perhaps the most important lesson of Grenada is the
value of bold, concerted, aggressive military action, even in the face of
incomplete intelligence and in spite of the certainty that some things will go
wrong. In this operation, aggressiveness contributed to a viable overall
strategic plan, which enabled the American force to perform very well in a very
demanding operation.
Intervention in Panama, December 1989-January 1990 [1]
Despite some negatives, the main lessons of this
operation against the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and General Manual Noriega
were overwhelmingly positive. The
cohesiveness of Operation Just Cause demonstrated the effectiveness of joint
planning and command structures instituted following enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Simultaneous, coordinated assaults, using forces from each of the
services, multiplied the impact of the whole operation. The action achieved a
large measure of tactical surprise. The
fact that the initial, critical stages of the intervention were carried out at
night was particularly significant. As
one commander noted, "We owned the night." Unmatched U.S. night fighting capabilities have constituted a major U.S.
tactical advantage ever since. Panama
was clearly a case in which adequate force was applied concertedly to
accomplish well-defined objectives with minimal casualties.
Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991
The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the remarkable
reconstitution of U.S. military power in the fifteen years following an
institutionally devastating defeat in Vietnam. In all, 541,000 U.S. military personnel were committed to Operation
Desert Storm, along with some 200,000 allied forces. Not surprisingly, given the size, complexity, and importance of
the conflict, the effort to draw appropriate lessons has been extensive, and it
continues to this day.
The most obvious conclusion is that no nation today
can directly challenge U.S. conventional military strength, and it would be
folly to try – a lesson our potential foes are certain also to have
learned. Beyond that, the conflict
demonstrated the efficacy of precision munitions; the success of stealth
technology; the critical importance of air supremacy; the advantages of night
operations; the ability of air power, under the right conditions, to disable an
enemy’s command and control infrastructure; the immense importance of sound
military doctrine and operational tenets derived from a careful study of past
conflicts; the critical importance of unified command; the advantages of a
well-trained professional military force; the value of attack helicopters,
close support aircraft, and a number of other platforms when used creatively
and with a full understanding of their potential vulnerabilities; the critical
importance of information dominance; and the absolute necessity of good
diplomacy in managing relations with allies and in deflecting serious outside
challenges to the cohesiveness of a broad coalition. On all these diverse matters, the critical lesson is to keep
doing what we have been doing.
There are some other, more cautionary lessons to be
learned, however. The vulnerability of
U.S. forces – and of critical allies – to weapons of mass destruction was a
matter of grave concern. In the end, deterrence seems to have worked, but we
need to consider whether it might fail in different circumstances. An immense effort was devoted to hunting
down mobile missile launchers, but with no success at all. Desert Storm showed that much work remained
to be done to provide critical intelligence immediately and directly to the
forces that need it. While command and
control arrangements worked very well by previous standards, air tasking orders
had to be put on paper and flown out to aircraft carriers every day – not the
way, in the information age, to carry out a complex, multi-dimensional campaign. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, before Operation Desert Storm
began, the United States and its allies had almost five months to build up
military forces in the region. No enemy in the future is likely to allow us
such a luxury.
Bosnia, 1992 to present
In June 1992, elements of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) were deployed to Bosnia in an effort to help
restrain a growing civil war. As the civil war worsened, and the situation
deteriorated further, the United States had a very difficult time deciding how much
involvement U.S. interests warranted. Lack of American leadership risked weakening the NATO
alliance. Until the last half of 1995,
NATO’s half-hearted efforts at coercive diplomacy, including the use of
“pin-prick” air strikes, accomplished almost nothing.
A more extensive application of air power in
Operation Deliberate Force, in contrast, was highly successful. Coupled with a Bosnian government ground
offensive, it succeeded in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to make critical
territorial concessions at the negotiating table. With U.S. leadership NATO finally managed to forge a peace
agreement and salvage its shaken credibility. The ongoing peace operation in Bosnia has also been largely
successful. Assurances that U.S. troops
would be withdrawn within a year were not realistic, however, and the operation
now appears open-ended. Cuts in the
size of the peacekeeping force and extensive use of reserves in Bosnia have had
some effect in ameliorating the burden. But Bosnia – and now Kosovo – remains a costly commitment.
Kosovo, 1998 to present
With Yugoslav government violence against ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo mounting, on March 24, NATO began air strikes against
targets in Serbia and Kosovo. President
Clinton said that the objectives of Operation Allied Force were to demonstrate
the seriousness of NATO’s purpose, to deter an even bloodier offensive by
Yugoslavia against innocent civilians in Kosovo, and, if necessary, to
seriously damage the Serbian military capacity to make war in Kosovo. [2] Instead of capitulating, however, Yugoslav
forces intensified their operations in a massive ethnic cleansing campaign to
drive ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo.
In response, NATO progressively escalated the pace of
its air attacks and extended its target set. Target selection initially focused on airfields, air defense, and
military communications. Attacks
subsequently were expanded to military barracks and military equipment
production facilities in Serbia, to logistical support facilities and lines of
supply throughout Yugoslavia, to Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, to electrical
transmission facilities, and to television and other media outlets. Toward the end of the campaign, there
appears to have been an effort to attack economic targets of particular value
to Serbian leaders. Finally, on June 4,
the Yugoslav government announced that it would accept a G-8 peace plan that
called for an immediate cease fire, withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and
other security forces from Kosovo, deployment of an international peacekeeping
force, and steps toward self-governance for Kosovo. On June 10, with evidence that Yugoslav forces were withdrawing,
bombing ceased.
From the beginning of the campaign, the military
logic of Operation Allied Force was a matter of intense, even bitter debate. In
short, at least in its inception, the Kosovo air campaign was an exercise in
coercive diplomacy rather than a concerted effort to prevail through military
action by destroying the enemy’s capacity to wage war. And to the extent it became a war fighting
exercise, it was much more a war of attrition than a modern U.S.-style application of decisive force. In this case, though, all of the attrition
was on the other side. From NATO’s
point of view, this seems to have been enough, since Milosevic ultimately
capitulated. It was not, however,
enough to protect the Kosovars from the depredations of Yugoslav security
forces.
Implications for Current Debates
The value of reading and rereading history is not
that old truths bear repeating, but that historical understanding is always
new. Real events are always
multifaceted and complex, and our perspectives on them always change when we
view them through the prism of more recent experience. Looking back on these operations today turns
out to be quite informative in discussing a number of contemporary issues. While others may distill different lessons from
this brief review of recent military operations, here are a few perspectives
that seem particularly relevant to current concerns.
The Use of Force Debate
Debate over
whether and under what conditions to undertake military action is nothing
new. Ongoing debates over the use of
force have stirred in every administration, and will likely have to be
addressed anew by every future government. Those who take absolute positions on the issue – especially when
disputes break along partisan lines – are likely to have to swallow their
arguments later. In recent debates
about Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, some have taken the so-called “Weinberger
Doctrine” almost as gospel. The
argument is that U.S. forces should be committed only when vital U.S. interests
are at stake, when the mission is clear, when force fully and demonstrably
adequate to accomplish the mission can be applied, and when public support is
assured.
But that argument was vigorously disputed within the
Reagan Administration, particularly by then-Secretary of State George Shultz,
from the moment it was articulated. Moreover,
the Weinberger Doctrine clearly did not prevail in later decisions on the use
of force, even when Weinberger still led the Defense Department.
For military commanders, the lesson is that they
cannot pick and choose what missions to prepare for. Political leaders may well decide that national security
interests require the use of force even in circumstances that give military
planners fits, or that detract from other priorities, or that may cost lots of
money at a time when funding is tight, or that risk unpredictable bad
consequences. This is not to say that
commanders should simply salute and say “can do” when given any job. Political decision-makers, too, should have
learned that missions should be defined as clearly as possible. Adequate force should be applied. Force protection must be a high
priority. Military commanders should
properly point up all these lessons, but they cannot expect political leaders
to agree, as one commentator would have it, that "superpowers don’t do
windows."
Fear of Casualties
There has been a vigorous discussion recently about the effects a fear
of casualties may have on the ethos of U.S. military forces. Looking back a few years – beyond Kosovo and
Bosnia – confirms that this as a very serious issue. Aggressiveness of American
military commanders has often been critical to the success of the
operations. Anything that might erode
the elan of U.S. fighting forces, therefore, ought to be troubling. It is also true, however, that force
protection is critically important. It
was lacking in Lebanon, with disastrous effects. And aggressiveness cannot be
disconnected from a viable strategy for prevailing.
It is tempting to draw an obvious conclusion – that
if a mission is not sufficiently important to U.S. national interests to
warrant risking casualties, then it may not be worth doing at all, among other
things because casualties may erode popular support and cause the operation to
fail anyway. But this is a bit too
simple. Political leaders cannot avoid
deciding on military action when public support is uncertain. It may not be unrealistic or unreasonable,
in some circumstances, to choose a course of action that minimizes the risk of
casualties even at the cost of failing to maximize military effectiveness. The critical task is to accept risks when
necessary and to avoid them when unnecessary, and to imbue U.S. military
leaders, from the top of the chain of command to the bottom, with the wisdom to
know the difference.
Relations with Allies
Relations
with allies are never easy. Allies
often perceive interests differently. And even when their interests and ours appear to coincide closely,
history, domestic politics, varying military capabilities, and personal
relationships among national leaders will affect the prospects for
cooperation. One lesson of recent
military operations is clear – the United States must be militarily and
diplomatically flexible enough to cooperate with allies as much as possible,
but also to act with limited allied support when necessary. As Winston
Churchill put it so well: "There is only one thing worse than fighting with
allies – and that is fighting without them."
Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo raise much more
complex and controversial issues. One view
is that the United States should not have become involved in either place,
because U.S. interests were not sufficiently at stake to justify the costs and
risks of military action. But as Bosnia
shows, when major allies have decided to act, and the United States agrees with
the goals of their action, then it is very difficult for the United States to
wash its hands of responsibility entirely. Clearly the Bush Administration did not want to get involved in leading
a military campaign in Bosnia, and the Clinton Administration tried to avoid it
for another two-and-a-half years. Having offered support to the allies in the first place, however, it
became too difficult – perhaps even impossible – to allow the cause to
fail. Ultimately, American leadership proved
necessary. The lesson is that
commitments to allies can draw the United States into conflicts where direct
U.S. interests are limited, but where our interest in the continued vitality of
the alliance may require American leadership. But this should hardly be a startling notion. It is simply to say that the benefits of alliances entail some
costs as well.
The Need for Across-the-Board Strength
Even
apparently limited military operations have required a very broad range of
well-trained and well-equipped forces. The interception of the Achille Lauro
hijackers, a very minor exercise of force not discussed in this paper, was
conceivable only because the United States had in place an extraordinarily
varied number of critical elements. It required a highly effective global intelligence capability,
including human intelligence as well as high-technology means of collection;
air combat forces that could be deployed rapidly and flexibly; other air assets,
including electronic warfare aircraft, already in place in the region to
monitor sudden and unexpected developments; sophisticated radar, able to pick
out an individual aircraft rapidly in an area of high air traffic, already in
place in the region; special operations forces that could be deployed on
immediate notice and transport aircraft able to carry them 6,000 miles across
the Atlantic; a global communications network that allowed planners in
Washington immediate access to intelligence and unbroken links to forces in the
region; a history of engagement with many nations in the area that allowed
timely contact with key decision-makers; and well-trained, well-motivated
personnel in every one of these critical operational areas. All of this is expensive -- the nation
cannot expect to have global reach on the cheap.
Things to Work On
While the United States has achieved a remarkable string of military
successes in recent years, a review of past operations also shows some
vulnerabilities. To their credit, the
military services have recognized a great many of them, and have worked to
correct them. Urban warfare is an
obvious problem. As conflict with Iraq
shows, weapons of mass destruction may pose a disabling challenge to U.S. power
projection capabilities. We need a much
deeper discussion of ways to ensure deterrence. Tracking down and destroying mobile targets remains an
unresolved, serious problem. Though it
may have been politically impossible to mount a ground operation in Kosovo that
could have forestalled ethnic cleansing, it is critically important,
nonetheless, to consider how a preemptive operation might have been
mounted. The Army deserves credit for
its current focus on building more deployable forces. Still, much remains to be resolved in determining precisely how
lighter ground forces can accomplish critical missions.
An important unresolved issue is how to ameliorate
the burden of ongoing operations, such as those in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia,
and now in Kosovo. Measures adopted to
ease the burden have not gone far enough. Clearly there needs to be a discussion of more radical changes,
including at least the strengthening of non-military multinational institutions
to take on the chore of nation-building and perhaps extending to the
establishment of an international constabulary force for ongoing peacekeeping
missions. Such steps have not been
popular in Congress, but these or other measures need to be reconsidered.
We’ve Done a Lot Right Perhaps the most important lesson of recent
conflicts is simply that the U.S. military has done a lot right. One can see in the series of conflicts
reviewed here a progressive, substantial, lasting improvement in key
capabilities, reflecting the willingness of the U.S. military to seek out and absorb
the lessons of each new operation. The
few years between Grenada and Panama, for example, witnessed improvements in
command arrangements, in operational planning, in tactics and doctrine, in
training, and in key technologies such as night vision equipment. The years between the Persian Gulf War and
the Bosnia and Kosovo air campaigns showed the maturation of precision strike
capabilities. The Army and the Air
Force have both learned the need to be more readily deployable in an
unpredictable global environment, and both services are reorganizing
substantially to become more flexible.
Congress, too, has sometimes helped. Congress’s establishment of an independent
Special Operations Command in 1987 has been vindicated by the continued
critical importance of special operations forces a host of military actions
since then, and by the marvelous performance of those forces when called
upon. Congressional passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clearly helped to clarify
and strengthen command arrangements.
The main praise for building an increasingly flexible
and effective force, however, must go mainly to the generation of military
officers that rebuilt U.S. military capabilities after the Vietnam War. This generation has now almost entirely reached
retirement age. The task of the next
generation of military leaders is to learn as well as its predecessors.
[1] A
major source for this discussion is Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause:
The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988-January
1990, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1995.
[2] See
Paul Gallis, coordinator, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied
Force, Congressional Research Service Report RL30374, November 19, 1999, p.
2.
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