The United States Military in the 21st Century
General Anthony C. Zinni
USMC (Retired)
In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell. More than
any other event it marked the collapse of the Soviet Union. I remember crossing through a vacant Check
Point Charlie into East Berlin. No one
on either side quite knew what we could or could not do, since it all happened
so fast. The confusion and stark
contrast between East and West Berlin made it hard to believe that we could
have once feared this collapsed Warsaw Pact or seen it as a serious global
competitor. The West always contended
that Communism was a fundamentally flawed system that would eventually fail. Despite that accepted belief, we were
clearly caught by surprise by the sudden and total end of the Soviet empire and
the system that governed half the world. At the time our president proudly announced what logically appeared to
be the correct conclusion to be drawn from these events. He said there would now be a "new world
order" and others talked of reaping a "peace dividend" as
defense spending could now be surely reduced.
Our
nation did make a half-hearted attempt to repeat something akin to the Marshall
Plan by trying to help the Former Soviet Union, as it was then known, through
the looming political and economic crisis it certainly faced. The effort was called Operation Provide
Hope. It was conceived by our Secretary
of State and was intended to encourage an effort by international contributors
of resources and advisors to help the Former Soviet Union enter the world of
democracy and free market economy. There was also a military-to-military program designed to connect to the
Russian military to build relations and to help them through the transition. Those of us involved in these efforts were
disappointed as interest by nations, including our own, in these programs
seemed to fizzle. The post-conflict
lessons from two world wars seemed forgotten as our attention turned inward
toward domestic concerns and as the world breathed a collective sigh of relief
after a half century of facing global destruction. Provide Hope seemed to me to be an uneasy recognition that the
world just might not reorder itself in positive ways.
As
if to punctuate the end of this historic era and to mark the last days of the
most powerful military ever fielded, we were given one final chance to
demonstrate the might of our cold war military machine. The challenge was presented by a third-rate
dictator, Saddam Hussein. The
superiority of our technology, soldier skills, and military leadership
completely dominated the Soviet surrogate force fielded by the Iraqis. I recall being in Eastern Europe shortly
afterwards visiting military schools and commands where the officers seemed
awed and amazed at the total dominance by the U.S. military in the Gulf
War. It seemed a fitting last act for
our powerful cold war military as it exited the world stage after decades of
standing tall and preventing a devastating global conflict.
The
United States military came down rapidly after these events, too rapidly. Suddenly careers were terminated, units were
disbanded, and bases were closed. I
remember, while stationed Europe, the personal trauma I witnessed as massive
reduction-in-force notifications were announced and good soldiers were
eliminated from the ranks and proud units furled their colors. There did not seem to be any logic to the
drawdowns. It appeared that we would
just have a smaller version of our cold war force. Despite a "bottom-up" review and other bureaucratic
quick studies, no sense could be made out of
the residual force. We lacked strategic direction, a
forward-looking force design, and a logical future threat base on which to build
our new military for the upcoming century. We settled on something called a two "Major Theater of War" or
"Major Regional Contingency" concept as a basis for our military
structure. Originally designed to be a
rough force sizing construct, this concept became our strategy in the absence
of serious strategic thinking and analysis. Basically, it described the military requirement as a force sufficient
to fight a Desert Storm and a Korean conflict "near simultaneously,"
whatever that meant. The force remained
fundamentally structured, equipped, organized, and trained the same way it was
for the cold war period with some evolutionary modernization for certain
capabilities.
Something
strange began to happen, however, as our congressional neo-isolationists were
proudly declaring their lack of possession of passports and disinterest in
foreign policy. The new "world
order" was turning into the "new world disorder." The world suddenly seemed to be exploding in
conflicts based on ethnic, religious, and historic hatreds that were lying
simmering under the superpower bipolar lid that kept them suppressed. Some nation states collapsed into anarchy
and chaos and others showed alarming signs of becoming incapable or failed
states. Certain of these collapsed states
provided sanctuaries to extremist groups who used these bases to plan, train,
and organize for strikes against U.S. forces and other targets. Natural and man-made humanitarian
catastrophes were on the rise along with civil strife that seemed out of
control in some parts of the world. Regional hegemons and rogue states who learned the lessons of the Gulf
War began to develop what has become known as "asymmetric"
capabilities or threats that were designed to go against our evident military
vulnerabilities or gaps. These
asymmetric threats ranged the spectrum from weapons of mass destruction and
long-range missiles to low-tech sea mines and terrorist tactics. All were designed to challenge a perceived
weakness in our military, political, or psychological ability to use force.
The
new world order was changing in other ways also. Globalization and the explosion of information technology were
making the world more interdependent and interconnected. Geographic obstacles such as oceans and
mountain ranges no longer provided impenetrable boundaries. Economic, political, or security-related
instability in remote parts of the world was having a greater effect on our
security interests and well-being on this shrinking planet. In addition, the rise of nonstate entities
such as nongovernmental organizations, transnational criminal groups, extremist
organizations, global corporations, and warlord groups brought a new confusing
dimension to a world previously dominated by nation state interaction.
Remote
places such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, East Timor, and others became
flash points that required our intervention at some level. At the same time, the need to contain
regional threats like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea still remained a major
military requirement. These were also
becoming more threatening as they developed greater military capabilities that
were aimed at denying us access to regions and our allies within those regions. More and more our security interests seemed
to be drawn into remote, unstable parts of the world.
As
a result of these sorts of events throughout the last decade of the 20th
century, our shrinking and adjusting armed forces were hit by an onslaught of
strange, non-traditional missions that pressured their dwindling ranks
and resources with an operational and personnel tempo that was not sustainable.
They were called upon to keep the peace, provide humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, fight the drug war, patrol our borders, counter
terrorists, contain regional hegemons, rebuild nations, and meet domestic
emergencies. These were consuming tasks
that were not popular in a military readjusting from the cold war and meeting
the challenges of an increasing number of imposed social changes and other
internal difficulties.
With
some exceptions, the U.S. military generally resisted these missions and the
adjustments it should have made in doctrine, organization, training, and
equipment needed to meet this new mix of growing commitments. These missions had significant political,
economic, humanitarian, cultural, and social dimensions that brought into
question the appropriate role of the military in problems that seemed better
suited for other agencies. Traditionalists in the military leadership ranks insisted on holding the
line to only fighting our nation's wars and hoped to go back to "real
soldiering" as they were mending a transitioning force suffering from all
the pressures on it. One of our most
senior military leaders was quoted as saying, "Real men don't do
MOOTW." MOOTW means Military
Operations Other Than War, a term that became the title for all these messy
little low-end commitments.
The
stress of the changes, confusion over missions, poor readiness conditions,
constant deployments, lack of direction, and atrophying benefits, compensation,
and quality of life impacted the critical areas of recruitment and
retention. With a booming economy on
the outside, even the most dedicated service members were finding it difficult
to remain in the services under these conditions. It became evident as the 20th century closed that we had a
military in dire need of direction and reform. It was difficult for our political leaders to commit the resources
necessary for this, since there were pressing domestic needs and the military
still looked like the most powerful force in the world.
We
have now entered the 21st century, and several serious questions and challenges
face our military that must be addressed. The first has to do with the growing number of these nontraditional
threats. Will these continue to
increase with new types added to the confusing mix, and will we rely on the
military as our principal instrument to deal with them? Second, can we afford the kind of military
that can meet all the potential challenges ahead that could span the spectrum
from dealing with an emerging global power to confronting strong regional
powers with significant capabilities such as weapons of mass destruction to
responding to the growing list of transnational threats? The third question relates to the
much-needed military reform. Can the
military change, reform, or transform to meet the challenges of the new century
and adapt to the rapid development of new technologies that could radically
alter the military as we know it today? The fourth issue deals with interagency reform, which is necessary to
move in parallel with military reform. Can we meet the demand for better decision-making and the integration of
all instruments of power (political, economic, informational, etc.) to solve
the multidimensional challenges ahead?
No
one can predict the future, but we can make some judgments on the growing
number of threats that face us at the beginning of this century. Some of these will not be what we prepared
for in the last century. All of them
will challenge a positive new world order and the realization of a peace
dividend.
Our security interests will
require that we have a military capable and prepared to respond to:
- a
global power with sophisticated military capabilities
- regional
hegemons with asymmetric capabilities, such as weapons of mass destruction and
missiles, designed to deny us access to vital areas and regional allies
- transnational
threats that include terrorist groups, international criminal and drug
organizations, warlords, environmental security issues, health and disease
problems, and illegal migrations
- problems
of failed or incapable states that require peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, or national reconstruction
- overseas
crises that threaten U.S. citizens and property
- domestic
emergencies that exceed that capacity of other federal and local government
agencies to handle
- threats
to our key repositories of information and our systems for moving information
This
is a demanding list of requirements to place on our military and it doesn't
include many of the clean, clear warfighting missions that our military would
prefer. We have sworn to defend "against
all enemies foreign and domestic" and the "enemies" that
threaten our well-being may include some strange, nontraditional ones.
The
destabilizing environment in which we may commit forces to confront many of
these threats may be further degraded by the effects of urbanization, economic
depression, overpopulation, and the depletion of basic resources. The world has become reliant on natural
resources and raw materials that come from increasingly unstable regions with
the compounding problems of a poor infrastructure and environment. Access to energy resources, water sources,
timber, rare gems and metals, etc. is becoming a growing rationale for
intervention and conflict in many parts of the world in these conditions.
We
will also require that our forces continue to meet the peacetime demands of
engagement and shaping. The importance
of maintaining stable regions by building viable, interoperable coalitions with
the forces of regional allies will remain a necessity to ensure a positive
security environment in key areas of the world. Military engagement efforts produce dividends in deterrence,
confidence building, and burden-sharing. They also demonstrate our commitment and resolve. These tasks will, however, continue to tax
our thinly stretched forces as they do today.
Some
proposals have been put forward to drastically cut force structure now, remove
forward-based and deployed forces from overseas, and stop modernization in
order to afford a transformation. Advocates of a "strategic pause" who think we can withdraw
from the world or opt out of interventions that threaten our interests are not
facing the reality of the current world situation. We cannot gamble on a self-ordering world, since the risk to us
could be great if we are not capable of militarily dealing with an unforeseen
threat that emerges from this disordered global environment.
All
these considerations point out the critical need to transform our military in a
very deliberate and thoughtful, as well as significant, way. Americans must acknowledge this need and
support investment in this transformation for it to succeed. The transformation must be major in scope to
meet the challenges of this new century; however, it won't be given the
resources if the American people don't understand and support the resource
expenditures required. This will
require a stronger and closer relationship between Americans and their
military. This relationship has drifted
apart, and even been strained at times, since the end of the Vietnam War and
the inception of the all-volunteer force.
The
transformation should begin with the development of a realistic strategic
direction. Never in our history has the
need been greater for a national strategy that clearly spells out interests,
goals, priorities, and resource allocations. From this a national military strategy can be drawn that provides the
necessary guidance and direction to our defense leadership. They, in turn, must take a hard look at
every aspect of our military and the agencies that support it. The decisions they make or recommend should
be done honestly and without the influences of service bias or
sentimentality. Decisions to eliminate
capabilities are never easy but must be made. Some capabilities will have to be phased out over time as new,
innovative capabilities come on line through the process of
transformation. Other capabilities
based on sound concepts and technology that have future viability should be
retained and programmed for modernization.
This
process of change has to be extensive and should include a review of our
personnel system. Leader development
must produce leaders with broader and more sophisticated educational and
service experience. It may be time to
age the force to gain more experience with longer service, more time in grade,
and a greater variety of experiences. The policies that foster careerism should be removed or overhauled. Quality of life areas, compensation,
benefits, personal development, challenging experiences, and personnel
stability have to be key considerations in getting and keeping the best and
brightest our society has to offer. The
future military will be an even more complex institution and will require truly
competent and dedicated members.
Processes
such as acquisition, readiness measurements, requirements definition, and
doctrine development are all in need of reform. The military's organization, structure, core competencies, and
operational concepts need review. We
must seriously address joint and combined warfare and recognize this as
synonymous with the operational level of war requiring a true capability to
integrate forces, not just deconflict and coordinate their efforts. True coherence will come in these operations
when we can think past service component integration to thinking about
integrating forces within the domains of maneuver, fires, information, and
sustainment. Services must eliminate
interservice bickering and corrosive competition that result in dysfunctional
force applications or the absence of needed warfighting doctrine and
procedures.
Our
organization and methods for providing military advice and recommendations for
national security policy have to be examined. History has not been kind to the structure created by the 1947 National
Security Act, as criticism after each conflict since has been severe. The interagency mechanism for dealing with
crisis and providing crucial decisions must be revamped to remove the ad hoc
nature of the process and the organization.
We
have to come to grips with the issue of the appropriate ethos for our service
members. Are they still warriors
requiring an ethos much like their uniformed forefathers or have technology and
changing social attitudes made that outdated? It is hard to imagine that the coming age of cyber-warriors and
remote control battle has removed the need for a warrior culture. The kinds of conflicts we still face require
that we take a long look at what the forces of political correctness and social
change have done to morale, good order and discipline, and combat
effectiveness. Related to this are the
attitudes and atmosphere
that generate a zero-defects mentality and a casualty and risk aversion
approach to tasks that jeopardizes our ability to accomplish vital missions.
Change
is difficult in militaries that have not suffered a disastrous defeat or faced
an immediate threat to the existence of the nation. Fortunately we don't face those conditions, but that can serve to
mask the need for change. In the past legislation
has been required to impose significant change absent these conditions. The military bureaucracy and politicians
with vested interests in preserving status quo infrastructure, systems,
organizational structures, and programs will resist change or will only support
change on the margin. This will further
complicate the needed reform.
It
is evident there will be some change in our defense structure. Certainly the projected world's challenges
to our interests seem to require a different kind of military to deal with
them. Both sides in the last
presidential election took positions advocating transformation and change, and
the American public seems generally supportive. The question is whether there will be significant change or
whether the politics, bureaucracy, traditional thinking, and other demands on
resources will limit our ability to realize the full benefits of major change
and true transformation.
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