The Joint Task Force - May 2003

• Books
• Documents
• Articles
• Doctrine
• Miscellaneous Documents and Reports
• Appendix A: Selected Recent Joint Task Force Operations

BOOKS

U 253.5 .U8 1989 A32
Adkin, Mark. Urgent Fury. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

         A solid, detailed overview of the operation that most clearly highlighted the difficulty of forming a JTF on short notice. Adkin gives an overview of the issues, excellent maps of the battlefields, and good analysis of the difficulties that plagued the NCA, the theater staff, and the JTF. Pages 126-144 outline the formation and crisis action planning for JTF 120.

UB 212 .A6
Allard, C. Kenneth. Command, Control, and the Common Defense. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. (See page 73 and index)

         A comprehensive history of the American military command structure. The author calls for the Services "to develop and refine a truly unified body of joint military doctrine."

UA 23 .M23 1990
Blackwell, James A., ed. Making Defense Reform Work. Washington: Brassey's, 1990.

         A collection of eleven essays on topics such as planning military operations; the role of joint military institutions in defense resource planning; and planning, programming, and budgeting, all of which composed the final report of the Project on Monitoring Defense Reorganization, a joint effort of the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Contains excellent background information and thoughtful essays on the topic of defense reform.

E 745 .B57
Bolger, Daniel P. Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988.

         An excellent analysis of some recent military engagements, the Mayaguez recapture, Gulf of Sidra air engagement, Grenada invasion, and Achille Lauro action. Demonstrates how very violent and prone to military action the post-Vietnam period has been.

JZ 1480 .D57 2002
DiPrizio, Robert C. Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.

E 183.8 .P2 D66 1991
Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama. New York: Lexington Books, 1991.

         Operation JUST CAUSE was probably the most meticulously planned and well-rehearsed JTF campaign in US history; still Donnelly describes problems with timing, rules of engagement, public affairs, post-conflict resolution, and integration of joint forces. Superb detail at the tactical level. The conclusions, pages 393-412, are must-read material, stressing the U.S. night fighting advantages and the great benefit of proper training.

UA 23 .G22
Gabriel, Richard A. Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.

         Gabriel, the author of Fighting Armies: Antagonists of the Middle East; To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics; and Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon, has, in his own words, produced a book that "is highly critical of the American officer corps." He reviews the Sontay raid, the Mayaguez incident, the Iran Rescue Mission, the bombing of the Marine Compound at the Beirut airport, and the Grenada operation. In a stinging summary, he writes that "The American military has failed to meet the test of battle because its structure is so deformed that it cannot produce officers--planners and leaders-- who are well versed in the arts of war." Should be read for historical insight.

UA 830 .J63
Johnson, Maxwell O. The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-1982. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983.

         Using Congressional hearings, speeches by members of the Reagan and Carter administrations, press releases, and interviews with Department of Defense and Department of State officials among other sources, Dr. Johnson reviews the "Carter Doctrine," the origin and role of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. He concludes that the RDJTF was "a valuable instrument of American foreign policy and a capable military force."

U 260 .K6 1988
Kokko, Richard W. Joint Operations Involving Marine Amphibious Forces and Army Airborne Forces. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1988.

         An examination of joint operations in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Grenada in 1983. The first section reviews these two operations; the second discusses different models for force deployment; the third section addresses command and control issues.

Lowe, Karl H. Applying Rapid Decisive Operations: Possibilities for 2010. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2001. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400591

DT 658.22 .O3
Odom, Thomas P. Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988. (Leavenworth Paper, no. 14)

         A unique analysis of joint/combined operations in central Africa. Odom writes excellent analysis in a readable format. Pages 25-74 outline the planning phase of Operation DRAGON ROUGE; lessons learned, highlighting the weaknesses in planning and the chaotic nature of the command and control system begin on page 153. Odom states, "[I]nteroperability is the overriding issue in any combined operation." Other conclusions illustrate how "too many bosses" and ineffective communications were major limitations.

UA 27 .R2 Q85
Quinlan, David A. The Role of the Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment Forces. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983.

         Quinlan points out the advantages of U.S. Marine task organization in rapid deployment operations.

UA 27 .R2 R3
Record, Jeffrey. The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1981.

         In his January 20, 1980, State of the Union address, President Carter declared that "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." As a result of this declaration, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was formed, and charged with "identifying, training, and planning the employment of units suitable for rapid deployment." This monograph argues that the Rapid Deployment Force was a "fatally flawed"...hastily thrown together collection of existing units...suffering from inadequate strategic and tactical mobility as well as forcible-entry capability." Record analyzes in some detail the RDF, its weaknesses, and possible solutions.

U 260 .S82 1994
Stewart, George, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel. JTF Operations Since 1983. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994.

         A summary of recent Joint Task Force operations. Includes summaries of 21 operations including URGENT FURY, JTF LEBANON, EARNEST WILL, LOS ANGELES, PROVIDE TRANSITION, JTF ANDREW, RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE PROMISE, PROVIDE REFUGE, AND SEA ANGEL. For each operation the authors describe the mission, background, timetable, participants, command and control arrangements, lessons learned, a summary, and references.

TOP

DOCUMENTS

AD A394 687
Alberts, David S. Coalition Command and Control: Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA394687

UB 23 .A67
Anno, Stephen E., and William E. Einspahr. Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1988.

        A valuable study of communications lessons learned from recent conflicts. The authors make a solid case for unity, simplicity, and autonomy in command and control. They also offer insight into the nature of successful communications architecture and proper communications planning.

AD A312 172
Benfer, Dennis E. Theater Logistics: Should There Be a Joint Support Command. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA312172

U 260 .B3 1991
Bentros, Lance A. Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-service Military Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

        "U.S. military doctrine recognizes the need for JTFs in responding to the global commitments of the nation. Unfortunately, Service incompatibilities and parochialism often have hampered the joint commander's ability to get the job done."

AD A230 368
Berg, Scott A. Introduction to Command, Control and Communications (C3) through Comparative Case Analysis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1990.

AD A403 628
Bohnemann, Edward T. Rapid, Decisive Operations: The Execution of Operational Art by a Standing Joint Task Force. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, 2002.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA403628

AD A250 546
Boy, Wayne W. Joint Task Force-Bravo--A Model for Forward Presence. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992.

        Author describes Southern Command's JTF-Bravo as an example of a way to "transition from forward deployment to forward presence in the face of declining resources."

AD A394 042
Carter, Ted E., Jr. Theater Air Mobility: Historical Analysis, Doctrine and Leadership. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2000.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA394042

UB 212 .C65 1991
Coleman, John C. Tumbling "Component Walls" in Contingency Operations: A Trumpet's Blare for Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

        "Do the combatant CINCs require a standing joint task force headquarters to provide operationally effective and efficient command and control during contingency operations where forced entry or other immediate commitment to combat action is required?"

AD A300 229
Colodney, Lori L. Operational Command and Control for Joint and Component Commands: Integration or Duplication? Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College,1995.

        Is current command and control doctrine, both joint and Service, adequate to ensure interoperability for a joint task force? The author focuses on the invasion of Grenada, and concludes that Service component commands must plan for joint interoperability to improve joint operational command and control.

AD A297 852
Cowan, John W. Operation Provide Comfort. Operational Analysis for Operations Other Than War. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Dept., Naval War College, 1995.

AD A325 110
Davis, Dawne M. Operational Logistics in MOOTW: What Your CINC Needs to Know. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA325110

AD A217 256
Deulley, Gary W. Joint Organization: Where Do We Go after Goldwater-Nichols? Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989.

        See pages 23-26 on joint training. "By increasing joint exposure for all officers through education and exercises, all officers will become more familiar and eventually more effective in the joint arena."

AD A295 932
Ferguson, Warner T., Jr. Operation Provide Comfort. A History of JTF--A Logistical Operation. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1992.

AD A300 214
Flynt, William C., III. Broken Stiletto: Command and Control of the Joint Task Force During Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 1995. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA300214

AD A217 341
Fondren, James W., Jr. Joint Task Force Operations in the Persian Gulf. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989.

        A JTF under U.S. Central Command was developed to protect eleven U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tankers from attack by Iran. Reviews Operations EARNEST WILL and PRAYING MANTIS, and Joint Task Force Middle East. Although military operations were predominantly Navy in July 1987, by September of that year the joint task force was an integrated force.

AD A279 515
Foster, William F., Jr. From the Sea: Refining an Old Idea. Newport, RI: Dept. of Operations, Naval War College, 1994.

AD A266 909
Garretson, Jeremiah F. Confronting Challenges to Jointness: Initiatives for Joint Command and Control. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.

        This paper, using C4I for the Warrior as a jumping off point, examines operational requirements for C4I systems. The joint task force is the logical benefactor of such support.

UB 212 .G5
Gilbert, Daniel J. Joint Task Force Command, Control, and Communications: Have We Improved? Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1989.

        "Is today's JTF commander better able to command and control his force than those who executed joint operations since the end of the Vietnam war? Have previously identified C3 problems been fixed and if not, why not?"

AD A298 174
Gillard, David W. The Joint Task Force for All Occasions: Military Operations other than War to War Fighting. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1995.

AD A403 513
Gordon, John, IV and Bruce Nardulli. The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA403513

AD A266 560
Grant, Nicholas P. Joint Task Force Staffs: Seeking a Mark on the Wall. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.

        This paper describes three current approaches to preparing JTF staffs for contingency operations, those of EUCOM and PACOM, and the Joint Staff, integrated approach.

AD A234 163
Haith, Michael E. CINC-ronization (Synchronization): The Critical Tenet in Future Operational Art. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.

        "The purpose of this paper is to examine the critical synchronization issues confronting CINCs and Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders in joint and combined operations. An excellent outline and one of the most useful descriptions of joint force synchronization in print.

AD A391 765
Harmer, Todd P. Enhancing the Operational Art: The Influence of the Information Environment on the Command-and Control of Airpower. Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 2000.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA391765

UB 212 .H4
Helmly, James R. Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing Joint Task Force. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1991. 1 vol.

        "In structuring contingency forces envisioned in the future military strategy we should recognize battle and historical experiences and organize these forces into a standing JTF."

AD A272 885
Henchen, Michael L. Establishment of a Permanent Joint Task Force Headquarters: An Analysis of Sourcing a Command and Control Structure Capable of Executing Forced Entry Contingency Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

        Henchen asks whether a permanent joint task force headquarters should be established to "execute all U.S. military forced entry contingency operations." He points out that it is critical for a such a staff to have worked together on a continuing basis for effective operations. This is most important during contingency or NOPLAN operations where planning time is very limited. He concludes that regional security considerations, manpower, equipment, and funding factors all combine to make a strong case for a permanent headquarters that would then form the nucleus of a larger staff. Benefits would be derived from the concentration of effort into one entity, rather than a duplication of resources at each combatant command.

AD A326 142
Hermann, Robert and Larry Welch. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Integration . February 1997.

AD A256 594
Hildenbrand, Marc R. Standing Joint Task Forces--A Way to Enhance America's Warfighting Capabilities? Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College,1992.

        "Reviews current procedures for allocating forces for contingency operations, a concept for creating standing joint task forces, and gives a comparative analysis whose purpose is to develop a basis for determining whether current force allocation procedures or standing joint task forces better serve future warfighting needs."

AD A 381 640
Hoefel, John S. U.S. Joint Task Forces in the Kosovo Conflict. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2000.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA381640

AD A323 894
Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995.

AD A297 827
King, Robert H. NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force: Separable But Not Separate. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Dept., Naval War College, 1995.

U 260 .K53 1995
----------. Standing Up a Joint Task Force: The Acid Test. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1995.

        King describes the 'acid test' as the ability or inability to stand up a joint task force "in a fast rising crisis where forces must be immediately committed to combat." He argues that "crisis warfighting capability is currently jeopardized by the current approaches to JTF formation." One proposed solution is the formation of a standing JTF headquarters in each of the regional combatant commands.

F 1567 .K5 1991
Kline, Jared A. Joint Communications in Support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

        "This study analyzes the provision of tactical and strategic communications in support of JTF-South during Operation Just Cause, the American invasion of Panama, 20 December 1989-12 January 1990. Presents a detailed analysis of communications support provided to a joint task force engaged in a contingency operation...."

AD A378 774
Leonard, Joseph J. Operation Allied Force: What Happened to Operational Art. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378774

AD A249 846
Lewis, Robert D. Combined Joint Task Force Provide Comfort: What Are We Trying to Do? What Is the Way Ahead? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1992.

        What is the proper role for this JTF? Lewis identifies national policies that the JTF "appears to support," discusses military operations that the JTF "should be prepared to undertake," examines the associated risks of these operations, and finally recommends that the JTF be established as a permanent, regional force.

AD A272 515
Loper, Thomas C. A Candidate Functional Architecture Design for the Detection and Monitoring Process of a Counterdrug Joint Task Force. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1993.

        "The nature of a JTF is that of a temporary organization established from many organizations to accomplish a specific task. By designing the JTF using a systems engineering approach of top down decomposition, a format for the baseline requirements can be established." Loper uses the Counterdrug Joint Task Force as a model to describe requirements of most joint task forces.

U 260 .M18 1986
McElwee, Jerry W. Principles for Organization of Joint and Combined Staffs. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.

        The author describes the origin and role of the military staff, General Eisenhower's organization and use of supporting staffs, and World War II Pacific theater staff organization, and summarizes major organizational principles culled from Generals Marshall, MacArthur, and Eisenhower, and current corporate leaders.

AD A362 562
McGrady, E.D. and Smith, Karen. Haiti and the Future of Warfare. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1998. ProxyURL/Handle:
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA362562

AD A286 408
Meinhart, Richard M. Joint Task Force Proven Force: An Outstanding Success. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994.

AD A299 233
Metz, John M. Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA299233

AD A379 044
Mongillo, Nicholas. Navy Integration into the Air Force-Dominated JFACC. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA379044

AD A223 416
Morgan, Terrence C. Third World Arms Proliferation and Forced Entry Operations: Circumstances Demanding the Creation of a Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1990.

U 260 .M8 1992
Murdock, H.M. Doctrine for Combined Airborne and Amphibious Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

        An interesting analysis of the complexity of integrating airborne and amphibious operations in a joint/combined environment. Murdock writes a succinct analysis of the command and control difficulties in several historical examples and recommends two possible solutions using today's theater and JTF command elements.

AD A404 767
Napper, Jennifer. Information Management in the JTF. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404767

AD A400 764
Osborne, Craig A. Standing Joint Task Forces: Commands Now Needed. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2001.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA400764

AD A401 092
Parker, Timothy M. Making Fires Joint. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA401092

U 260 .P27 1997
Partin, John W. and Rob Rhoden. Operation ASSURED RESPONSE: SOCEUR’s NEO in Liberia, April 1996. [s.l.] History and Research Office, U.S. Special Operations Command [1997]

AD A348 443
Pease, Michael R. Information Superiority: "Where’s the Beef"? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1998.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA348443

UB 212 .R2 1991
Ramshaw, William S. Operation JUST CAUSE Command and Control: A Case Study. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1991.

        Straightforward account of the operational planning and C2 organization.

AD A283 478
Ratliff, Leslie L. Joint Task Force Somalia--A Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994.

AD A301 121
Reese, Robert J. Joint Task Force Support Hope: Lessons of Power Projection. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA301121

AD A210 929
Rodriquez, David M. Task Force Synchronization: What Is Essential? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1989.

        This work "discusses the importance of understanding time and space factors that are essential to the maneuver task force's ability to synchronize offensive operations."

AD A274 327
Ross, B.A. The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

        This document examines the establishment and structure of the joint task force headquarters in modern contingency operations by reviewing the theoretical foundations of command and control functions, analyzing selected historical examples of crisis response operations, examining current doctrine, and finally making recommendations for the best means of organizing the required joint headquarters.

AD A398 698
Row, Lisa A. A JTF Staff Structure for the New Millenium: Leaner, Faster, and More Responsive. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1998.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA398698

AD A407 748
Sachrison, Jon E. Joint Task Forces in the 21st Century: combat Multiplier or Force Degrader. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2002.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA407748

AD A 314 931
Sauer, Gary G. Networking the Commander and Joint Battle Staff of a Joint Task Force. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA314931

AD A250 545
Saunders, William A. Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures: A Critical Review." Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1992.

        "Joint Pub 5-00.2 does a good job addressing many of the doctrinal and procedural voids gleaned from lessons learned in past joint operations executed by a joint task force. However, this manual does not adequately discuss functional command organizations and relationships. Additionally, Joint Pub 5-00.2 should be evaluated in an exercise employing a short notice contingency scenario before its contents can be validated."

AD A274 105
Smart, A.G. Military Support to Domestic Disaster Relief; Doctrine for Operating in the Wake of the Enemy? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

        JTF Andrew, 1992, South Dade County and Homestead, Florida, in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. A solid analysis of the type of operation that is not currently well understood, but that will certainly grow in importance in the future.

AD A328 145
Straughan, Matt. Information Operations and Unity of Effort: The Case for a Joint Interagency Information Operations Task Force. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997.
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA328145

AD A341 449
Strong, Mark A. Joint Task Force XXI: SOF as Executive Agency in Military Operations Other than War. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1997.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA341449

AD A382 095
Stuart, Robert M., II. Network-Centric Warfare in Operation Allied Force: Future Promise or Future Peril. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA382095

AD A264 283
Tegen, Carl M. Joint Communications Doctrine at the Operational Level. Newport, RI: Dept. of Operations, Naval War College, 1993.

AD A325 240
Tindal, R.L., III. The Joint Task Force Commander Afloat: Doctrinal Challenges. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1997.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA325240

GAO/NSIAD-94-47
U.S. General Accounting Office. Joint Military Operations: DOD's Renewed Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important but Not Adequate. Washington, GAO, Oct. 1993.

        This report discusses DOD's efforts to overcome persisting interoperability problems. The focus is on system and operational operability associated with C4I. The conclusion states that "interoperability effectiveness could be strengthened by assigning primary responsibility to the U.S. Atlantic Command for assessing C4I requirements for the potential effect on joint task force operations...."

DS 318.8 .U6
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations Review Group. Rescue Mission Report. Washington, 1980. (Also known as the Holloway Report)

AD A307 057
Walker, Daniel R. The Organization and Training of Joint Task Forces. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1996.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA307057

AD A283 470
Weber, Bruce A. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: A New Model for Lead Nation Command? Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994.

U 260 .W674
Worley, D. Robert. Challenges to Train, Organize, and Equip the Complete Combined Arms Team: The Joint Task Force. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 1998.

U 260 .W67 1996
Worley, D. Robert, Michael H. Vernon, and Robert E. Downes. Time and Command Operations: The Strategic Role of the Unified Commands and the Implications for Training and Simulations. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, Oct. 1996.

TOP

ARTICLES

        An examination of lessons learned by the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) from Operation ANDREW RELIEF and Operation RESTORE HOPE. Concentrates on the "strategic level and the boundary between the strategic and operational levels of Army activities." Focuses on the themes of mission planning and deployment challenges, the complexity of operations other than war, and the training and preparations required for future similar operations.

Ballard, John R. and Steven C. Sifers. "JMETL: The Key to Joint Proficiency." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995, pp. 95-98.

Barry, Charles L. "NATO's Bold New Concept - CJTF." Joint Force Quarterly, no. 5, Summer 1994, pp. 46-54.

Blair, Dennis C. "Change Is Possible & Imperative." Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, May 2001, pp. 46-50.

Bloechl, Timothy D. "Operation JUST CAUSE: An Application of Operational Art?" Low-Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Winter 1993, pp. 546-577.

        A summary of Army doctrine, followed by an overview of the events in Panama just before JUST CAUSE, then a comparison of operation planning and execution with doctrine. JTF-P (Joint Task Force Panama) is briefly discussed.

Burger, Kim. "USA Seeks to Boost Joint Task Force C2 Capabilities." Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 Aug. 2001, p. 5.

Canby, Steven L. "Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, pp. 68-75.

Chelberg, Robert D., et al. "EUCOM-At the Center of the Vortex." Field Artillery, Oct. 1993, pp. 12-16.

        Signals that EUCOM's approach to its burgeoning series of crises is the establishment of a JTF training program. JTFs are "not only force enhancers, but a necessity for mission accomplishment." The authors give a sound overview of the options confronted when forming a JTF, ending with the final recommendation that the formation of a standing JTF is not the right response. They offer a superb overview of the JTF stand-up process within the framework of JOPES orders from the CJCS and outline some critical staffing recommendations that include the use of theater J-3 and J-5, J-6 and PAO personnel. Early additions of JULLS specialists to the JTF by EUCOM is a productive idea. The article includes a section on "Training the JTF" and another on useful conclusions, including the idea that JTF operations start and continue at "a flat out sprint from day one." The authors advocate an expeditionary mindset and increased training for potential JTF staff officers.

Cittadino, John C. "C3I for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)." Signal, Sept. 1981, pp. 31-34 +.

"Civil Disturbance Rules of Engagement: Joint Task Force Los Angeles." Army Lawyer, Sept. 1992, pp. 30-32.

        JTF Los Angeles was composed of almost 10,000 members of the California National Guard, 1,500 Marines from Camp Pendleton, and 1,700+ soldiers from the Army's 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord. This article contains the rules of engagement for this task force.

Cooke, Thomas. "NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor." Parameters, Winter 1998/99, pp. 124-136.

Cushman, John H. "Fight as a Team." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan. 1993, pp. 58-62.

        "Prospective commanders should ignore Washington's roles-and-missions flummery and exercise hands-on control of assigned forces to accomplish the mission, regardless of service doctrine--in short, to fight as a team."

__________. "Joint Command and Control." Military Review, July 1990, pp. 25-34.

        "The U.S. military future clearly lies in jointness; joint C2 should...be its leading wave. But joint force interoperability, team training and all-service C2 systems today leave all too much to be desired." General Cushman reviews the origin of this problem, and, using a theoretical new unified command, points to C2 deficiencies stemming from an "enduring legacy of service compartmentalization, even in unified commands."

__________. "Joint, Jointer, Jointest." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1992, pp. 78-85.

        Joint Task Force Provide Comfort, commanded by MG James L. Jamerson, USAF, was formed on 7 April 1991 to bring humanitarian relief to Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein's troops. By mid-April, then-LTG John Shalikashvili took over command of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort. The article describes how the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, along with units from the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Canada, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Australia, and Luxembourg, worked together in one of the most joint and combined missions assembled to date.

__________. "The New USACom: Providing the Punch." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1994, pp. 96-99.

        General Cushman discusses USACOM's responsibilities for conduct joint training of JTF staffs and prepare "joint force packages" for employment. Adaptive joint force packaging is defined, and some of the inherent problems with this concept are raised.

Duncan, James C. "The Commander’s Role in Developing Rules of Engagement." Naval War College Review, Summer 1999, pp. 76 – 89.

Findlay, Michael. "SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task Forces." Special Warfare, Spring 2000, pp. 10-17.

Flores, Susan J. "JTFs: Some Practical Implications." Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1995, pp. 111-113.

Franke, Henry G. "Ocean Venture 93: An Overview." Field Artillery, Oct. 1993, pp. 17-19.

        Using a recent joint exercise as a backdrop, the author gives an excellent overview of JTF formation, command relationships, and employment. He correctly outlines the component relationships and the role of critical joint boards. Franke stresses the importance of coordination between echelons and offers a useful outline of JTF employment.

Goodman, Mark T. "Standing Joint Task Force: Opportunity Lost." Marine Corps Gazette, Sept. 1998, pp. 38-39.

Gordon, John IV, et al. "The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 2001/2002, pp. 52-57.

Harper, Gilbert S. "Logistics in Grenada: Supporting No-Plan Wars." Parameters, June 1990, pp. 50-63.

        In an article relevant to joint task forces from the logistics point of view, the author clearly describes logistics requirements for operational success.

Hayes-Roth, Frederick. "Common Strategy Promises Faster Computing Advances Implementation." Signal, Oct. 1995, pp. 64-66.

Hellwig, Frederick C. "Defending Information Operations at the Joint Task Force." INSCOM Journal, Spring 2001, pp. 22-23.

Hollis, Patricia Slayden. "Joint Integration: The Key to Combat Effectiveness." Field Artillery, Nov./Dec. 1998, pp. 7-10.

        Interview with General Anthony Zinni on establishing JTF Resolute Response.

Hunt, Mark. "’C4I for the Warrior’ in Action: Challenge Athena Touches GW Battle Group." Surface Warfare, July/Aug. 1995, pp. 18-19.

Laquement, Richard A., Jr. "Welding the Joint Seams." Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Oct. 2002, pp. 82-85.

Lenac, Randolph S. "Optimizing for the Future: Command Element Alternatives." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1995, pp. 56-60.

Linn, Thomas C. "The Cutting Edge of Unified Actions." Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1993/94, pp. 34-39.

        Linn states that "joint task forces are seen today as a means of tailoring military responses to a growing number of crises." He finishes by stating that the "integrity of tactical units which do the fighting must be preserved with a result that the force is more joint and combined at the top than at the bottom." Includes a summary of recent joint task forces.

Macgregor, Douglas A. "Command and Control for Joint Strategic Operations." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, pp. 25-33

McCarthy, James P. "Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations." Naval War College Review, Winter 1993, pp. 9-21.

        The former D/CINCEUR gives the reader a series of axioms to guide potential commanders through pitfalls of joint operations. After a succinct overview of the crisis action planning process, McCarthy offers some seasoned insights into the weak points of joint military responses, including failure by many to use the full authority given a joint commander through the DOD reorganization Act of 1986, the importance of communications and interactive discussions during planning, the need to fully understand and then adapt to changes in mission (he advocates continual estimates of the situation with the on-scene perspective being given the most weight), the tendency not to use the best forces for the job, the tremendous impact of the politics of any military operation, the power of CNN reporting, the need to expect and anticipate problems, and the vital importance of momentum in modern warfighting (he includes a recommendation for the formation of a J-5 future plans cell within JTFs). He ends with a caveat on the difficulty of coalition operations. Overall, a thought-provoking and valuable article for any professional involved in modern military operations.

McKearney, Terry J. "Rethinking the Joint Task Force." Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Nov. 1994, pp. 54-57.

Metzger, James W. "Fleet Validates Joint Mission Force Concept." Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Jan. 2002, pp. 88-96.

Meyer, John J., III. "Joint Task Force Communications for Command, Control and Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal, Spring/Summer 1993, pp. 73-76.

__________. "JTF Communications: The Way Ahead." Military Review, Mar. 1993, pp. 85-87.

        Colonel Meyer argues forcefully that existing commercial communication systems must and can be available to JTF commanders. He suggests that the Defense Information Systems Agency take the lead in guiding DOD investment in commercial capabilities.

Michalovich, Michail M. "Consequence Management 101: Forming and Deploying a Joint Task Force for Consequence Management." Marine Corps Gazette, Sept. 2000, p. 36+.

Miller, Paul D. "The Military after Next: Shaping U.S. Armed Forces for the Next Century." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Feb. 1994, pp. 41-44.

        A report on the capabilities derived from adaptive joint force packaging and joint task forces, and the new mission of the Atlantic Command.

Mink, Allan L. "JTF Planning Cell: Initial Response to the Yugoslavia Crisis." Military Review, Mar. 1994, pp. 68-70.

O’Connor, Maureen. "Signal Organization: Reorienting to Support Joint-Task-Force Operations." Army Communicator, Fall 1998, pp. 37-41.

Otis, Glenn K. "Employing the Options: How a Joint Force Commander Views the Roles and Missions." Landpower Essay Series, Oct. 1994, entire issue.

Otis, John F., Jr. "Joint Task Force Operations." Marine Corps Gazette, Jan. 1987, pp. 24-26.

        Good short primer for the division of responsibility and requirements for a Marine Component Commander within a JTF. This article is particularly strong in its definition of the roles of the Naval Service component commanders (NAVFOR and MARFOR) and the more traditional Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander, Landing Force (CLF) relationships within a JTF executing an amphibious mission. Otis makes a strong case for always naming a MARFOR commander.

Packett, Virgil L, II, and Timothy M. Gilhool. "Diplomacy by Other Means: JTF Aquila Responds to Hurricane Mitch. Military Review, Mar./Apr. 2000, pp. 81 – 85.

Potkovic, Troy M. "Operation Continue Hope: Maintaining Intelligence Credibility." Military Intelligence, July/Sept. 1995, pp. 18-20.

Prueher, Joseph W. "Rethinking the Joint Doctrine Hierarchy." Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, pp. 42-45.

__________. "Warfighting CINCs in a New Era." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1996, pp. 48-52.

Roberts, Jerry A. "Ocean Venture 93 and the Joint Targeting Coordination Board." Field Artillery, Oct. 1993, pp. 20-21.

        A superb, detailed analysis of the functioning of a critical joint board, the JTCB. Roberts breaks down the steps in the joint targeting process and offers a useful JTCB agenda for JTF joint fires personnel. He even suggests a clear delineation of the separation of responsibilities in the joint fires arena. A must for JTF staff officers.

Roos, John G. "Joint Task Forces: Mix'n'Match Solutions to Crisis Response." Armed Forces Journal International, Jan. 1993, pp. 33-39.

        "U.S. military officials have long paid lip service to the utility of joint military operations, but the idea was repeatedly short circuited by inter-Service rivalries. It took nothing less than the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact threat...to get leaders wearing different uniforms genuinely interested in the unique capabilities each Service could lay on a planning table."

Sawyer, Darren. "JTF, JIC Operations: ‘Critical Success Factors.’" Military Intelligence, Apr./June 1995, pp. 8-12.

Shelton, David L. "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation RESTORE HOPE Somalia." Marine Corps Gazette, Feb. 1995, pp. 37-40.

Shelton, H. Hugh. "Depth and Simultaneity: Half the Battle." Military Review, Dec. 1993, pp. 57-63.

Smith, Dan. "Doctrinal Issues in Joint Targeting." Military Intelligence, October/December 1994, pp. 37-39.

Smith, Edward P. "NEO Operations: The SETAF Experience." Military Review, Mar./Apr. 2000, pp. 88-89.

Smith, Edwin P. "Joint Task Forces and Preemptive Response." Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998/1999, pp. 91-99.

Stanton, Martin N. "Task Force 2-87: Lessons from Restore Hope." Military Review, vol. 74, no. 9, September 1994, pp. 35-41.

Steele, Dennis. "Kosovo: The Task Force Commander’s Viewpoint." Army, Sept. 1999, pp. 35-36+.

"Tactics, Techniques and Procedures from Task Force Hawk Deep Operations: Operation Allied Force." Volume I. Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, Aug. 2000, entire issue.

        See also Volume II, March 2001; Volume III, July 2001.

Tangredi, Sam J. "Who’s Afraid of the NETF?" Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Nov. 1999, pp. 44-47.

"Task Force Eagle Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs): Information Operations." Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, Oct. 1999, entire issue.

Valliere, John E. "Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change." Parameters, Autumn 1992, pp. 69-82.

        Analysis of the failed 1980 mission to rescue American hostages held in Iran. Discusses the planning, OPSEC, and command and control issues relating to JTF 1-79. The author states that "the ambiguities of Eagle Claw planning were its downfall. The questions that should have been asked were not...."

Wallace, Stephen O. "Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations." Special Warfare, Jan. 1996, pp. 36-41.

        Focus is on the Civil Military Operations Center.

Worley, D. Robert. "Joint Task Forces: Options to Train, Organize, and Equip." National Security Studies Quarterly, Winter 1999, pp. 31-48.

Yancey, Dianne. "Joint Task Force-Bravo." Military Police, June 1993, pp. 12-14.

        Headquartered at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, JTF Bravo is a 1,200-person joint U.S. Army-Air Force task force performing three missions: nation building, training, and contingency planning.

Yates, Lawrence A. "Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause-- Before and After." Military Review, Oct. 1991, pp. 58-71.

        "Joint Task Force Panama was the organization activated by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, in April 1988 to coordinate security operations, engage in contingency planning, and manage tactical aspects of the crisis." Dr. Yates is also the author of Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966.

TOP

DOCTRINE

CJCSM 3500.04C Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 1 July 2002

CJCSM 3500.05 Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, 15 April 1997

JFSC Pub 1 The Joint Staff Officer's Guide. 2000.

Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces. 10 July 2001.

Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. 14 November 2000.

Joint Pub 1-01.1 Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications. 23 April 1999.

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.

Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations. 10 September 2001.

Joint Pub 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. 19 September 2001.

Joint Pub 3-03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. 10 April 1997.

Joint Pub 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 April 1998.

Joint Pub 3-05.1 Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 19 December 2001.

Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. 16 June 1995.

Joint Pub 3-07.3 JTTP for Peace Operations. 12 February 1999.

Joint Pub 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations. 17 February 1998.

Joint Pub 3-07.5 JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 30 September 1997.

Joint Pub 3-07.6 JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 15 August 2001.

Joint Pub 3-08 Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, vols. 1 & 2. 9 October 1996.

Joint Pub 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.

Joint Pub 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. 9 October 1998.

Joint Pub 3-14 Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. 9 August 2002.

Joint Pub 3-16. Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. 5 April 2000.

Joint Pub 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 14 November 1994.

Joint Pub 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 13 April 1995

Joint Pub 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning. 25 January 2002.

Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance & Procedures. 13 January 1999.

Joint Pub 5-03.2 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) 10 March 1992.

Joint Pub 6-0 Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations. 30 May 1995.

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations . 16 June 1997. AD A407977. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997.
 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA407977

TOP

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

Ellertson, Jack, and Robert Kloecker. "The Challenge of Joint Force Training." HQ USEUCOM. Draft (7) document.

__________. "Forming the Joint Task Force: HQ USEUCOM's Approach to the Process." 3 Nov 92. Unpublished document.

McCarthy, James P. "Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations."
U.S. European Command. 15 May 1992.

Mink, Al. "Joint Task Force Planning Cell; Developing U.S. Responses to the Crisis in Yugoslavia." Draft document. 3 Nov 1992.

Sattler, John F. "Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Briefing."
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/t01102003_t01110hoa.html.. 10 Jan. 2003.

U.S. European Command. Headquarters. Joint Task Force Staff Officer's Brain Book. 2d ed. April 1993.

        Includes sections on the "USEUCOM Approach to Forming a JTF," USEUCOM AOR, course of action development, typical rules of engagement, command relationships.

TOP

Appendix A: SELECTED RECENT JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

TOP

Please see a librarian for assistance in searching the electronic resources found in the library.

Researched and compiled by Library Director, Joint Forces Staff College, May 2003