
A BRIEF HISTORY OF IO EVOLUTION IN STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY

In 1980, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWEC) activated at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio Texas as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activity (CCA). Along with the traditional military capability of targeting and physical destruction of enemy command and control capability, electronic warfare (EW) was a prominent activity in the various Military Services. The US Air Force and Navy maintained the majority of the EW capability in terms of platforms designed to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, and that dominance was critical to the Cold War defense strategy. The DoD needed a joint organization that could provide linkage between Service EW capabilities.

In 1994, the JEWEC was re-designated as the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) and assigned to US Atlantic Command (USACOM). USACOM later became US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The change of the JEWEC to the JC2WC was a result and reflection of the lessons from Desert Storm and the tremendous success against Iraqi command and control capability in a 40-day targeted air campaign on Iraqi forces and communications facilities. It was also the first time that information-related aspects of IO became integrated into the warfighting command's war plans in such a deliberate and prominent way. The emergence of computer network operations and how those operations were planned for, and integrated into joint planning and operations became part of the JC2WC portfolio as well.

IO gained wide acceptance in joint doctrine in the mid-1990s with the release of Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 titled "Information Operations." Correspondingly, the JC2WC was renamed the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) in 1999 and was assigned to US Space Command (USSPACECOM). The

assignment to USSPACECOM was a result of the mission changes at USJFCOM to focus on joint training and doctrine.

As a result of the attacks of September 11, 2001, USSPACECOM was renamed as US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in 2002 and given a primary mission focus of homeland defense. The JIOC transitioned to become a component of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as a result of that change in mission. In 2005 the JIOC was reflagged as a command and became the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC). In 2009 the command designation was removed and the JIOWC became a "center" once again. USSTRATCOM has remained the higher headquarters for the JIOWC from 2002 to the present.

In October of 2011, the JIOWC will again become part of the DoD Joint Staff as a CCA. It truly has been a full-circle evolution through the years from a Chairman's activity in the beginning of the JEWEC, through three different combatant commands, and back to a CCA 31 years later. It is a remarkable legacy to the evolution and change of the JIOWC and of the traditional warfighting activity of IO. Through all the changes, the JIOWC remains an operationally focused organization that has strived to provide the best services possible to warfighters at all levels. It is a legacy to be proud of and a foundation for an even brighter future.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Looking at the future of IO, to include recent discussions that will shape its future is instructive. The changes all reflect demand signals that have existed since the inception of IO as a core competency of the DoD. Joint commanders intuitively understood the potential of the capability, but were frustrated in getting the feedback reflecting actual IO efficacy. This frustration resonated through the DoD. There was not, and still is not, a standardized certification process for a joint IO

HOW DID WE GET HERE

- **FY10 Congress requested more fidelity related the nature/effectiveness of IO activities**
- **SecDef ordered Front End Assessment**
- **Various studies/reports within DoD have addressed SC/IO issues; these include: SC CBA, JIOFOS, McCarthy Quick Look Assessment, PSYOP Policy & Program Review, IG and several recent congressional reports**
- **SecDef memo; codified SC/IO/PYSOP definitions, roles & responsibilities, management & oversight, resources/training & education**

Slide from Brigadier General Rowayne Schatz Jr. Town Hall Meeting with the JIOWC Staff in Feb 11

Source: Joint Staff J39

planner. Unlike other military disciplines, there is no specific Service specialty that seamlessly generates a joint IO planner capable of stepping into a joint IO staff position. The intelligence community did not, and still does not, have the relevant training nor the collection capability to easily support IO planning and execution. IO requirements do not easily dovetail with acquisition processes and when resources are allocated to IO programs or tasks, there is no standardized way to respond to resource managers on task efficacy. The first major effort to address these problems was the DoD "Information Operations Roadmap," published October 30, 2003.

The Roadmap provided DoD a plan to advance the goal of having IO as a core military competency. It outlined 57 recommendations, and assigned responsibility for them to various DoD component heads, all reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, the related and collateral joint responsibilities hindered enforcing implementation of the 2003 recommendations, and as a result, the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) closed them and identified current deficiencies in the IO career force.

The "USSTRATCOM Combatant Command IO Assessments," from January and March of 2008, identified shortfalls; recognized themes and trends; identified high-impact, cross-cutting solutions; and made specific recommendations for improvement. The overall conclusion of the assessments was that, despite previous efforts to address IO deficiencies, shortfalls remained. In 2008, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) for Joint and Coalition Warfighting Support, at the time responsible for IO, conducted a Defense Wide IO Program Review (DWIOPR). Thirty-four organizations actively engaged in planning and executing IO within DoD were solicited for input for the DWIOPR. The report concluded that resource accounting was one of the key shortfalls: "Long term IO investment strategy development, growth, and execution has stalled within the Department due to inadequate resource accounting processes."

The Quadrennial Defense Review, (QDR) conducted in 2009 contained a subgroup co-led by OUSD(I), and the Office for Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), that studied issues related to IO. This working group produced an issue paper, (Package ID: 4591-01,

OUSD(I) "Redefinition and Organization Improvements to Information Operation-Information Operations Integration Organization") and concluded that the solution should include a new organization. The specifically defined organization never materialized, but it is interesting to note the needs this organization was to meet: manage Joint IO Force Development, Force Employment and Force Management processes.

This new organization was to integrate plans and capabilities laterally across the Joint IO Force. It was to establish IO integration metrics to measure operational success and merit, and establish the capability to create the foundation for assessment activities, data normalization, and knowledge management needed for the reporting of programmatic effectiveness and efficiency. The organization was also supposed to synchronize and de-conflict multiple regions' information activities. According to the issue paper this need had been met primarily through the JIOWC; however, it noted that the JIOWC had neither the resources nor the capacity to effectively conduct this mission. This gap in IO assessment was also affirmed in the Joint Center for

JOINT IO FORCE OPTIMIZATION STUDY (JIOFOS)

- **Sponsored by USD(I), USD(P), and JS**
- **Objective: Provide recommendations on policy, organizational, and procedural COAs that enable the Joint Force to optimally develop, integrate, assess and employ Joint IO**
- **Stakeholders: USJFCOM – Lead, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, USD(I)**
- **Scope:**
 - **Recommended solution became the basis for engaging DoD leadership on re-aligning or changing IO structures and processes required to effectively organize, train, manage, assess, and employ the Joint IO force.**
 - **Evaluated and assessed if present IO capacity was sufficient to meet COCOM requirements.**
 - **Recommended means and methods for determining IO measures of effectiveness and assessment**

- **Characteristics of effective IO management:**
 - **Coordination with Department and national policies**
 - **Understanding of all elements of IO capabilities**
 - **Integrated with military operations**
 - **Coordinated with interagency IO policies and activities (covert/overt)**

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Source: Joint Staff J39

Operational Analysis (JCOA) in-depth analysis of IO in Iraq between April 2008 and June 2009, as stated in the I2A Report, published 21 August 2009.

U.S. Central Command used 172 contract vehicles for IO in Iraq totaling \$270.1 million during FY 2006 through FY2008. In September 2009, DoD IG published their summary report on these contracts in response to a request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command to evaluate the IO requirements in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The commander asked DoD IG to identify and evaluate the process to establish and execute IO requirements and to identify the resources applied to meet those requirements. Additionally, the DoD IG was requested to evaluate the contracting process and the use of private contractors in support of IO.

The Joint Information Operations Force Optimization Study, (JIOFOS), sponsored by OUSD(I), OUSD(P) and the Joint Staff, was a USJFCOM-led study, with USSTRATCOM, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and OUSD(I) as the key stakeholders. JIOFOS was conducted in the Spring of 2010. Its objective was to provide recommendations on policy, organizational, and procedural courses of action that would enable the Joint Force to optimally develop, integrate, assess and employ Joint IO.

The recommended solution was to be used as the basis for engaging DoD leadership on realigning or changing IO structures and processes required to effectively organize, train, manage, assess, and employ the Joint IO force. JIOFOS was also to evaluate and assess whether present IO capacity was

sufficient to meet combatant command requirements. Lastly, the study was to recommend means and methods for determining IO measures of effectiveness and assessment.

As the JIOFOS study neared completion, other capability-based assessments and studies into related issues were also being completed. These included studies into electronic warfare, psychological operations/military information support operations (PSYOP/MISO), and strategic communication (SC). Questions about IO funding levels were also being raised by the House Armed Services Committee.

The culmination of all of these issues, reports, assessments and studies rose to the Defense Secretary's awareness level, particularly after congressional inquiries about IO funding and efficacy, and also because of a rising demand signal from the combatant commanders for support securing funding for critical IO programs.

Based on verified demand for IO support and information-related capability and activities, the Secretary of Defense directed a Front End Assessment of strategic communication and information operations, (SC/IO FEA). The SC/IO FEA was sponsored and led by the OUSD(P). Its objective was to provide the Secretary of Defense with recommendations on SC/IO and MISO definitions, DoD roles and missions, management and oversight, resources and also training and education. The SC/IO FEA was principally concerned with joint IO organization and integration above the combatant command level, and leveraged work from several IO studies surveys

28 September 2010 SECDEF Decides

- **JS (J39) designated as Joint Proponent for IO**
- **JS to develop and execute a detailed implementation plan to reorganize IO oversight and management**
 - **JS gains advocacy responsibility for military deception and operations security**
 - **US Special Operations Command retains advocacy for Military Information Support Operations**
 - **US Strategic Command retains advocacy responsibility for Computer Network and Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations**
- **Reorganize the Joint IO Warfare Center (JIOWC) to become part of the Joint Staff to assist in execution of proponent responsibilities**
 - **Ensure comprehensive assessment and reporting in response to DoD demands**
 - **Develop a force of trained and educated joint IO professionals**
 - **Provide joint IO force management**
 - **Provide enterprise and reach back support to COCOMs**
 - **Facilitate the integration of plans and capabilities and share best practices**

DECISIONS WERE ANNOUNCED IN THE 25 JANUARY 2011 SECDEF MEMORANDUM

SECDEF 28 SEP 2010 Decisions Presented by Brigadier General Rowayne Schatz Jr. Town Hall Meeting with the JIOWC Staff in Feb 11

Source: Joint Staff J39

and reports as stated above to provide analysis and recommendations. Secretary Gates' decisions regarding the SC/IO FEA recommendations were published as Secretary of Defense Memorandum titled "Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DoD," dated 25 January 2011 (See slide on Page 25). In terms of structure, the importance of the 25 January memorandum is the alignment of information-related capabilities to various organizations that would advocate for the capability and serve as its proponent. Per the memorandum, proponent responsibilities are: Military Information Support Operations (MISO), remained with US Special Operations Command; Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Operations remain with US Strategic Command; Military Deception and Joint Operations Security transition to the Joint Staff.

The Secretary's vision of IO reorganization was directly related to his view of current and future national security threats. With this background as

context, his view is summed up in recent Secretary of Defense memorandums to the department:


"Adversaries leverage multiple communications platforms to proselytize, recruit, fund, exercise command and control, share tradecraft, and perpetuate their ideology. Understanding the increasing complexity of the information environment and the compelling need to leverage information effectively as an element of national power is critical to achieving the Department's military objectives. Department of Defense policies recognize that information capabilities, including but not limited to, operations security, computer network operations, military information support operations, and military deception, can be developed and employed as traditional military activities in operational environments." (USSECDEF Memo

dated 6 December 2010, Request for Support of Funding Authorities to Conduct Information Operations)

In addition to the request for support of funding authorities the Secretary of Defense further clarified the direction of SC and IO in a Memorandum titled; "Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DoD" that was released on January 25, 2011. The essence of that memorandum is highlighted in the following excerpts:

"Across the US Government, all departments and agencies are struggling to adapt anachronistic programs and policies to acclimate to the evolving environment. Within DoD, combatant commanders have consistently communicated to me the importance of maintaining adequate resources and funding levels to conduct critically important information programs, especially within the context of increased

WAY AHEAD



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congressional scrutiny and reporting requirements in these areas.”

“On October 1, 2010, the Principal Staff Advisor function and responsibility for IO oversight and management moved from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The USD(P) will revise DoD Directive 3600.1 and DoD directive 5111.1 accordingly. This realignment of responsibility provides a single point for all components of the Department and our interagency partners. This realignment also assigns a single point of fiscal and program accountability; establishes a clear linkage among policies, capabilities, and programs; and provides for a better integration with traditional strategy and planning functions.”

“At the Joint Force level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will reorganize joint force IO development and management by assigning proponentcy for joint IO to the Joint Staff. This will create a single proponent for joint IO integration with designated, clear capability proponents...The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will develop and execute a detailed implementation plan that reorganizes elements of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC). The JIOWC, which is located in San Antonio, Texas is currently assigned to USSTRATCOM. The JIOWC’s Joint Electronic Warfare Division will remain assigned to USSTRATCOM, and the remaining elements of the JIOWC will be aligned with the Joint Staff.”

The intent of aligning JIOWC to the Joint Staff is to have the JIOWC become the “engine room” for IO governance in the IO enterprise. JIOWC will still maintain its close, personal and symbiotic relationship with the combatant commands; however, its new mission, while retaining certain aspects of its current mission of lateral support to operational joint force commanders, now has a new aspect of supporting and informing IO governance with accurate and relevant information. JIOWC will not make policy; however, JIOWC will inform and support policy makers. In order to conduct this new mission, JIOWC is in the process of reorganizing to prepare for CCA designation on 1 October 2011. Accordingly, JIOWC will be organized into five divisions that align to these tasks: Intelligence; Operations and Assessments; Mission Support; Advocacy and Force Development; and Operations Security support.


The JIOWC will continue to provide IO subject matter expertise and advice to the Joint Staff and combatant commands; facilitate combatant command and service collaboration efforts to identify and develop joint IO concepts and solutions; develop and maintain a joint IO assessment framework that measures and reports performance of IO capabilities supporting joint operations; assist in advocating for and integrating combatant command IO requirements; and, assist in coordinating IO force development requirements.

The streamlining of IO executive governance within OUSD(P), designation of the Joint Staff J39 as the joint IO proponent, and realignment and reorganization of the JIOWC as the “engine room” change the face of IO support to the joint force for the better. These changes in the future of the IO enterprise will enable it to focus on the IO requirements in the national security strategy. In the SC and IO memorandum, the Secretary

of Defense put it this way:

“These decisions will better prepare DoD for today’s rapidly evolving strategic environment. DoD must operate effectively in the information environment to defend the nation and to prevent, prepare for, and prevail in conflicts. These changes will advance IO and integrate the lessons we have learned into our organization and process.”

With a fully mission capable date of October 1, 2012, the JIOWC and the entire IO enterprise across the DoD will be uniquely positioned and transformed to meet the security challenges of information-related activities for the future. It is no small task to accomplish these revolutionary changes, but they will most certainly enhance the IO force and national security.



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