



CAMPAIGNING

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL (JAWS)



**JOURNAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART AND CAMPAIGNING**

SUMMER 2007



Mission

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School produces graduates that can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative.

Intent

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands with a cadre of officers expert in the joint planning processes and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations. Graduates will be capable of synergistically combining existing and emerging capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish a range of operational or strategic objectives.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of Defense.



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This edition of CAMPAIGNING reflects this hectic time of the year in the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) community. Our July issue comes between the frantic finish of one Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) class and the final preparations for an incoming class. Combined with the usual summer rotations, changes of duties and vacations for those lucky enough to find the time, our July edition of CAMPAIGNING is a bit leaner than recent publications. We continue to await several promised articles and papers as we work to find appropriate material for this journal. Add to this the continued deployment of our CAMPAIGNING editor, Colonel Craig Bollenberg, to OIF and we are fortunate to be able to distribute this edition of CAMPAIGNING.

Our content this quarter provides insight and updates regarding the JAWS program. The recent JAWS class graduated 36 students on June 15, 2007. Along with the graduating classes of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) and the Advanced Joint Professional Military Education Course (AJPME), the JAWS graduates prepare to join planning headquarters and staffs around the world. Over seventy percent of this year's JAWS graduates moved on to assignments in joint headquarters while the interagency and multinational graduates returned to their organizations with a new found appreciation of the art and science of campaign planning. This year's JAWS class witnessed growth to a third seminar and saw the graduation of our first students from the U.S. Coast Guard and from the United Kingdom. JAWS continues to play a noteworthy role in filling the worldwide demand for campaign planners and innovative operational-level thinkers.

This past year, JAWS students had an opportunity to participate in a plan review in partnership with U.S. Special Operations Command and also in a Strategic Vulnerabilities Assessment Project with the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Both of these projects were accomplished in addition to the demanding JAWS curriculum; both of these projects yielded superb insights and learning experiences for students and faculty alike. The feedback from USSOCOM and OSD demonstrated that these opportunities are well worth repeating. This edition of CAMPAIGNING includes an article addressing the Strategic Vulnerabilities project. Major Chris Bennet, USAF, a member of the team and the final editor, is a graduate of the JAWS class of 2007.

Also in this edition of CAMPAIGNING are abstracts of the 36 theses published by our JAWS class of 2007. These topics covered a broad array of subjects relevant to today's planning community. They demonstrate the scope of our students' research and should be of utility to those in academic and planning billets in a wide variety of organizations. Several of the theses were recognized with awards from the MacArthur Foundation, National Defense University Foundation, the Association of the United States Army and others at the recent JAWS graduation. The full texts of the theses are available on the Defense Technical Information Center (www.dtic.mil) or through the Joint Forces Staff College library. We hope you find these informative and useful.

As always, the quality of our journal depends on the readership and the willingness of planning practitioners to provide relevant contributions focused on campaign planning and related issues. We remain dedicated to providing a forum that gives planners a source of insight into current planning issues, concerns and developments. We continue to solicit articles and papers from our audience and we appreciate your inputs. Our readership continues to grow and the feedback we receive remains exceptionally positive. Please help us sustain this unique publication targeted toward the planning community. We need your letters, papers, articles and other materials for publication.

If you would like to be placed on the electronic distribution list for CAMPAIGNING or would like to submit an article or comment on an article contained in this edition, please e-mail your submission or comments to jerabekd@ndu.edu. As always, please pass this edition to your associates and contacts in our planning communities.

Fred R. Kienle
Colonel, USA
Dean, Joint Advanced Warfighting School



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Towards A New Strategic Imperative: From Fighting The Long War To Fighting To Win

BY

**COL Bob Warburg, WgCdr Andy Burton,
MAJ Jose Ocasio-Santiago, LCDR Brad Baker,
Maj Chris Bennett, LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer, Mr. John DeFoor,
Mr. Blair McFarland, and Mr. Anthony Stapleton**

Prologue

Earlier this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England extended a “voluntary opportunity” to the Department’s war colleges, to provide a concise assessment of a key U.S. strategic vulnerability, for consideration by DoD civilian and military leaders. The initiative is part of the broader mission to sharpen the Department’s processes for continual strategic review and adaptation. The war college “opportunity” was an effort to directly leverage the substantial warfighting experience and intellectual capital resident in DoD’s educational institutions.

A team of volunteer students from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School and their faculty mentors, with strong support from the Joint Forces Staff College leadership, eagerly accepted the challenge, and carried out extensive and rigorous analysis. The following article is based on their deeply thought-provoking final paper. (The specific views expressed are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense).

- Catherine Dale, Ph.D., Policy Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense



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On 9/11 a small group of Islamist terrorists carried to the U.S. a war that had been smoldering over the horizon for a decade or longer. In response, the Bush Administration outlined the way ahead in a series of policy documents including *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)*, *The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism (NSCT)*, and *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT)*. Initially branded the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the strategy has also come to be known as the “Long War.” This title is an acknowledgment of the challenging, time consuming task ahead, as well as a nod to the successful U.S. Cold War strategy that George Kennan first described as a “long war” in his famous 1946 Long Telegram from Moscow.

Six years after 9/11, success via the Long War approach may be beyond the reach of U.S. national power. The Long War strategy, lacking proper balance of ends, ways, and means could cripple the U.S. military, deplete American economic resources, exhaust U.S. diplomatic capital, and foment anti-American hostility. To effectively prosecute the GWOT, the U.S. must avoid pursuing unachievable utopian aims, and instead envision a focused, attainable strategic end state. Achieving this strategic end state requires careful use of key U.S. resources, be they global support, national will, economic vitality, fiscal sustainability, or military power. U.S. goals that are too broadly focused, inappropriate emphasis in the chosen methods and the significant risk of exhausting essential U.S. resources makes the Long War approach a strategic vulnerability.

Today the U.S. finds itself in a complex strategic environment that has evolved far beyond the parameters of the Cold War. Rapidly evolving technology, globalized business and social relationships, and expanding information networks connect people around the world. As the U.S. discovered with Abu Ghraib, images and perceptions now shape international public opinion as much as facts and reality.

The rise of non-state actors and a weakening of the Westphalian nation-state system have changed the rules of international engagement. Islamist terrorists seeking to establish a global caliphate capitalize upon every opportunity to twist regional and



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international events to their advantage. Seemingly simple situations are difficult for U.S. leaders to understand and otherwise straightforward actions are hard to execute.

Current U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan also impact the strategic environment. American failure in those countries would result in lost credibility, resolve, and international influence. Success would eliminate major safe havens for Islamist extremists; create ally states in the Muslim world, and free U.S. resources for other priorities. Either way, the outcome of these conflicts is an indicator of how the U.S. will fare in the GWOT, and discern whether the current Long War strategy is manageable.

The U.S. government is not postured to excel in this complex strategic environment. Government agencies operate in stove-piped settings, foreign affairs agencies are understaffed, and unity of effort is more sloganeering than reality. Policymakers must contend with Congressional oversight, influential lobbying groups, non-governmental organizations, and aggressive political action committees. Election cycles render politicians and voters unable or unwilling to see beyond the first order effects of policy.

[End State] Violent extremist ideology and terrorist attacks eliminated as a threat to the way of life of free and open societies. A global environment that is inhospitable to violent extremism, wherein countries have the capacity to govern their own territories, including both the physical and virtual domains of their jurisdictions. Partner countries have in place laws, information sharing, and other arrangements, that allow them to defeat terrorists as they emerge, at the local and regional levels.¹

Good strategy must conform to the strategic environment and be achievable with the capabilities and resources available, and accomplish the objective within an acceptable level of risk. Furthermore, good strategy must establish balance between ends, ways, and means, as well as satisfy the litmus tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.² When viewed in this light, the Long War approach suffers from a dangerous lack of clarity. The *NMSP-WOT*, which is strongly informed by the Long War

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (1 February 2006), 20-21.

² Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2006), 68.



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approach, aims to “defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society.”³ It is not immediately clear whether the goal of the Long War is the *total* elimination of *all* terrorism, or the focused destruction of terrorists directly threatening the U.S. and its interests. Defeating all violent extremism as a threat to free and open society is a utopian vision that is both unnecessary and unachievable. The recognition that terrorism cannot be completely eliminated around the globe is critical, enabling the U.S. to focus on defeating extremist groups which directly threaten its way of life.⁴

While understandable that policymakers hope to frame U.S. goals in terms that do not insult Muslims, the unavoidable reality is the U.S. does not need to wage a global war on terrorism, but rather must fight a war against *Islamist terrorists*. Al Qaeda and associated movements wish to spread their radical beliefs throughout the Muslim world and ultimately seek to establish a global caliphate and impose Islamic law on the entire world.⁵ Saudi Arabia’s aggressive exportation of the extremist Wahhabi strain of Islam and Iranian efforts to spread revolutionary Shia militancy radicalizes Muslim populations and incites anti-Western violence. In the face of such threats, framing the U.S. goal as prevailing in a generic struggle against unspecified terror and violent extremist ideology is dangerous and potentially self-defeating. The lack of clarity in the *NMSP-WOT* prevents the U.S. from correctly identifying the principal threats and the critical theaters. The U.S. experience in the Cold War is instructive in this regard. Despite setbacks such as the loss of China, stalemate in Korea, and defeat in Vietnam, the U.S. never lost sight of the primacy of de-legitimizing communism and defeating the Soviet Union in its struggle for control of Europe. Instead of a focused effort against Islamist extremists, the U.S. has taken on a Sisyphean task, while appearing imperialistic, antagonizing neutrals and allies alike, and losing international legitimacy.

³ NMSP-WOT, 19-20.

⁴ While the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, ETA in Spain, and the Sendero Luminoso in Peru are troublesome, they do not directly threaten the U.S. way of life.

⁵ Douglas J. Macdonald, *The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy*, Foreword by Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007), iii.



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The U.S. has identified the greater Middle East, south Asia, Africa and the Indonesian archipelago as the primary focus of strategic attention. These regions are home to a majority of the world's Muslims, they are the origin of Islamist terrorism and extremist ideology, and serve as the financial hubs for Islamist terrorist financing. Conflict in the Middle East threatens access to oil supplies and could undermine global economic prosperity. The U.S. must focus on destroying Islamist terrorist organizations, neutralizing terrorist enablers, and mitigating associated risks arising in these identified regions.

Of all the security threats arising in the Muslim world, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the most challenging. Unlike the Cold War era, the U.S. nuclear arsenal no longer provides the deterrent effect that it once did. Deterring a nation-state such as the Soviet Union is significantly different from deterring Al Qaeda and Islamist extremist groups. Under the Long War approach, the assumption that exporting liberal democracy will alleviate grievances and temper the behavior of Islamist terrorists and extremists permeates U.S. strategic thinking. In light of the devastating potential consequences of a terrorist WMD strike on American soil, U.S. strategists simply can not afford the foolish luxury of wishing away an existential threat. The U.S. must forgo vague hopes that democratization will temper the behavior of adversaries and instead establish means for deterring Islamist terrorist organizations and enablers who seek WMD.

Fortunately, the means for deterring these actors already exists in the form of the new triad. Following the success of the Cold War deterrent strategy, U.S. policymakers sought to capitalize on strategic nuclear capabilities while simultaneously adjusting U.S. nuclear force posture in the absence of a singular nuclear peer threat. The new triad combines nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities into a single offensive strike capability, and would give the National Command Authority (NCA) various options for preemptive and/or responsive actions. It also adds a combination of active and passive defenses, as well as a revitalized responsive defense infrastructure that could be aimed at *any* adversary - not just one posing a monolithic nuclear threat. First proposed in the 2001 *Nuclear Posture Review*



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(NPR), the new triad was further elaborated in the 2002 *Annual Defense Report* (ADR), and identified for future force structure in the 2006 *QDR*.⁶ However, the new triad has yet to be operationalized, and is not integrated into national or military strategic doctrine.⁷

Given the threat posed by Al Qaeda, it is time to operationalize the new triad. The U.S. must establish a strong link between deterrence, both nuclear and non-nuclear, and a positive duty on the part of all nation-states to prevent WMD attacks against the U.S. from being facilitated, planned, financed, or launched from their territory. Regimes which harbor or support Islamist terrorist organizations contemplating WMD attacks on the U.S., as well as rogue states such as Iran and Syria, must receive unequivocal warning that any degree of culpability in a terrorist WMD attack against the U.S. will result in devastating U.S. retaliation. To maximize deterrence, culpability in a terrorist WMD attack must include direct financial and logistical support, facilitation, willful failure to control sub-national groups, and ideological incitement. While remaining consistent with the long-standing preference for “strategic ambiguity,” the U.S. must stress that this retaliation may well include the use of nuclear weapons. Although the chances of deterring Al Qaeda with this approach are probably not very good, key Islamist terrorist enablers may well desist when forced to contemplate the ramifications of their support for WMD attacks on the U.S. As unpalatable as the prospect of the U.S. actually employing nuclear weapons may be, this revision of nuclear strategy would force overt and tacit enablers of Islamist terrorist organizations to realize that waging jihad against the U.S. using WMD places them and their nations in an existential struggle which they will not survive.

The key elements of the U.S. government GWOT strategy are: protect and defend the homeland; attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad; and support mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism.⁸

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review* (31 December 2001), foreword, U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, (2002), 83-92. *QDR*, 49-51.

⁷ The new triad timeline is depicted in ADR, 91. The new triad is not mentioned in the current NSS or NDS and is only briefly mentioned in the current *National Military Strategy*.

⁸ *NMSP-WOT*, 5.



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Goals, objectives, and terminology are critically important since they form the constellation that allows the U.S. to chart a course toward success in the GWOT. Problems with the strategic end state will almost certainly lead to a lack of balance in methods and risk the misapplication of key resources. The Long War approach has three primary lines of operation, supported by a number of cross-cutting enabling activities. It is hard to take issue with the first two lines of operation, defending the homeland and attacking terrorists before they can attack the U.S. The risks involved in these two lines of operation are significant, but can be managed and mitigated.

The third pillar, however, which calls on the U.S. to “support mainstream Muslims,” presents the gravest risk in the Long War approach. The *NSCT* argues that “through the freedom agenda, we also have promoted the best long-term answer to al-Qaida's agenda: the freedom and dignity that comes when human liberty is protected by effective democratic institutions.”⁹ This mindset reflects the broader U.S. aim of counteracting Islamist extremism by gradually expanding democracy in the Muslim world.

The ambitious goal of democratizing the Middle East requires sweeping cultural changes. According to scholars Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, fomenting fundamental change in cultural values and attitudes which shape the behavior of non-Western societies is a daunting task.¹⁰ As the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, efforts to foment profound cultural change in foreign societies do not readily translate into strategy. The halting democratic progress in these two countries suggest implementing cultural change within the Muslim world is likely to prove prohibitively expensive, and take far longer than the U.S. is prepared to wait.

Moreover, efforts to export liberal democracy to the Middle East are predicated on the assumption that there is a significant moderate element within mainstream Islam that is amenable to peaceful accommodation with the West. This assumption may well be

⁹ *NMSP-WOT*, 5 and *NSCT*, 1.

¹⁰ See Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000) for a detailed discussion of this topic.



unwarranted. As a Muslim reformer living in the West recently wrote: “It is vital to grasp that traditional and even mainstream Islamic teaching accepts and promotes violence.”¹¹ Perhaps more sobering is a recent poll cited in *The Economist* indicating that “eight percent of Muslims round the world – at least 80m people – strongly support terrorist acts against America.”¹²

Since the Middle East is unlikely to transition to liberal democracy in the foreseeable future, the real issue at hand is the outcome of an ideological struggle internal to Islam, in which radical Islamists are waging war on any moderate elements amenable to accommodation with the Western world. Internal political divides within Turkey, the most secular and modern Muslim state, provide a glimpse of this conflict.

The intra-civilizational struggle in the Islamic world is one which the U.S. and the West can only hope to impact peripherally. The U.S. should drop grand plans for democratizing the Middle East. The U.S. instead needs to focus primarily on containing Islamist violence within the boundaries of the Muslim world. This will necessitate redoubling U.S. efforts to destroy Islamist terrorist organizations, and to track down, capture, or kill known Islamist terrorists. The U.S. must cut off the flow of funds to jihadist organizations, preventing Islamist operatives from further radicalizing the large Muslim populations residing in Europe, Africa, and Indonesia. Similarly the U.S. should discretely support existing elements within Islam which favor peaceful accommodation with the non-Islamic world, while at the same time use diplomacy, alliances, strategic communications, trade, financial leverage, and development assistance to strengthen and enlarge the global community opposed to Islamist extremism.

International support, diplomatic leverage, national will, capable military forces, a robust national economy, and a sound federal budget are essential to achieving U.S. objectives in the GWOT. National strategic documents such as the *NSS*, *NSCT*, and *NMSP-WOT* extensively consider end states, objectives, and methods, but fail to focus

¹¹ Tawfik Hamid, “The Trouble With Islam,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 April 2007, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id+110009890> (accessed 3 April 2007).

¹² “If You Want My Opinion: Testing Muslim Views,” *The Economist* (10 March 2007), 58.



on the resources critical for success. This lack of consideration of means in the Long War approach poses a grave risk of depleting essential economic, military, and diplomatic resources.

The will of the American people is arguably the most critical national resource. The *NSCT* concisely summarizes the requirement for national will, stating “as always, we will rely on the strength of the American people to remain resolute in the face of adversity.”¹³ The U.S. government is not currently sustaining the national will necessary to win the GWOT. Public relations missteps along the lines of Abu Ghraib, coupled with disproportionate media emphasis on U.S. combat casualties erode national will. This creates momentum for strategic pull-back and neo-isolationism, and risks making the Long War unwinnable. Offering a compelling explanation of enemy objectives, as well as a coherent explanation of America’s goals, will fortify the will of the American people.

American military power is the most stressed national capability under the current approach. Prior to the GWOT, the nation’s military force structure was based on a 1-4-2-1 construct that consisted of the military protecting the homeland, operating in four forward regional areas, fighting two overlapping military campaigns, and winning one of those conflicts with a decisive and enduring operation.¹⁴ Fighting the GWOT was not factored into this calculus. This force construct was reevaluated in the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, and the decision was made that the future force structure would not support the 1-4-2-1 model. Rather, the new model focuses on three objective areas: homeland defense, the war on terror, and conventional campaigns.¹⁵ The *QDR* acknowledges the strain the GWOT places on the military, stating that “for the foreseeable future, steady-state operations, including operations as part of a long war against terrorist networks, and associated rotation base and sustainment requirements, will be the main determinant for sizing U.S. forces.”¹⁶

¹³ *NSCT*, 2.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (March 2005), 16. The *NDS* does state that this force structure will be reviewed in 2006 *QDR*.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (February 2006), 35-38.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.



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While describing in detail the ends and ways, the *NMSP-WOT* simply states “the combination of the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Combat Support Agencies, and the programs and resources of the DoD constitute the military means for fighting the GWOT.”¹⁷ The reality, however, is that once these resources are exhausted, the U.S. will be forced to alter its strategy. Given this dynamic, the U.S. must take steps to ensure the long-term availability of adequate military resources.

The economic impact of the Long War approach also merits serious consideration. A 2007 Congressional Research Service report calculated the total fiscal obligation to the GWOT as of March 2007 at \$510 billion.¹⁸ The U.S. economy is currently experiencing a prolonged period of economic prosperity and has so far been able to shoulder this economic burden. The Long War strategy assumes that economic growth will continue uninterrupted, and that the U.S. can continue to obligate large portions of its economic resources to the Long War far into the foreseeable future. While it is possible that the U.S. may be able to continue to fund the GWOT, strategists must balance this burden against other national commitments. Growing concerns about the viability of Social Security, the desire to reform health care, and the need for prudent fiscal policy are just a few of the many interests competing with the GWOT. Additionally, U.S. dependence on foreign oil appears to provide significant financial resources to Islamic extremists.

The *NSS*, *NMSP-WOT*, and *NSCT* chart the course for the U.S. to fight the GWOT using a Long War approach. While the Long War has some strong points, it has several weaknesses that pose a strategic risk to the U.S. The solution to preserving our national resources while prosecuting the GWOT lies in arriving at a viable strategic balance. The U.S. must be judicious in allocation of resources and guard against framing unnecessarily broad, utopian goals. At the same time, the U.S. must identify the primary threat and

¹⁷ *NMSP-WOT*, 8.

¹⁸ This cost includes Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Noble Eagle. Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, CRS Report for Congress March 14, 2007, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>, (accessed on 5 April 2007).



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the primary theater of operations, and resource and plan accordingly. It must marshal robust and dependable resources, to include national will, international support, a fully-resourced military, a credible deterrent against terrorist use of WMD, economic strength, and sound fiscal policy. Progress on seemingly unrelated issues, such as the formulation of a national energy policy emphasizing independence from foreign oil and the need to address the looming crisis in social entitlement programs, are also critical to success. Despite the difficulty of the task at hand, the U.S. has the resources and the capacity to prevail. By adopting a new strategic imperative, the U.S. can arrive at the proper balance of ends, ways, and means, and transition from fighting a Long War to fighting to win.

Epilogue

During the years between the First and Second World Wars, the Army and Navy's war colleges developed their students' capacity to think critically and strategically through the medium of high level planning for extant and emerging threats. Students were often presented the same strategic problems the Army and Navy Staffs faced. The schoolhouse provided the students an environment where they had the latitude to innovatively address these problems unencumbered by bureaucratic constraints or the press of day-to-day work. The requirement for this research paper was conceived in that rich tradition, employing bright and energetic student officers to examine a major strategic challenge for the United States. This inaugural effort proved beneficial for all involved; the students because they were forced to wrestle with all the dimensions of a truly difficult, real-world problem and those of us who reviewed their work because we gained fresh thinking on a problem that has escaped easy solution. The results of this effort have been most encouraging, enough so to establish such projects as a regular requirement in the Joint Advanced Warfighting School curriculum. The students who participated in this initiative are to be commended both for the quality of their work and the enthusiasm with which they undertook this ground-breaking project. The Department is better for having undertaken this initiative and will undoubtedly benefit increasingly as the program matures.

- Tim Hoffman, SES, Director, Security Cooperation



JAWS Thesis Requirement

A fundamental belief of the JAWS program is that the research and writing of a thesis is a critical element in the earning of a Masters of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The identification of an important topic in the field, the analysis and critical examination necessary to develop a thesis statement, and the academic rigor that makes up the researching and writing about that subject allows the student to critically reflect on their craft while adding to the professional body of knowledge.

JAWS graduates hit the ground running in the determination of a thesis subject and the subsequent development of their thesis. It is a process that they are required to complete within nine months. This timing is significant and critical since while completing their thesis they are also writing an individual operations plan in concept format.

Depending on the student's previous military education, JAWS serves as either intermediate or senior level Service college credit. JAWS intermediate level students write on a topic at the operational level of war, while senior level students focus on the strategic-operational nexus. Interagency students are asked to examine a strategic or interagency related topic.

The completed papers are submitted to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and are available through www.dtic.mil as well as through the on-line catalog of the JFSC Library link on the JFSC web site: www.jfsc.ndu.edu. This edition of CAMPAIGNING includes the abstracts of the theses completed by the JAWS class of 2007. We suggest you review the topics they researched. Consider which of those may be of use or interest to you, then contact DTIC for copies. The efforts of these JAWS graduates can provide unique, creative, and thoughtful approaches to a variety of subjects. We urge you to take advantage of them.



JAWS Graduating Class of 2006-2007 Thesis Abstracts

LCDR Bradford W. Baker, US Navy
CDR David L. Baudoin, US Navy
Maj Christopher L. Bennett, US Air Force
COL Clinton R. Bigger, US Army
LTC Darryl J. Briggs, US Army
Wg Cdr Andrew Burton, RAF
CDR Anthony P. Chatham, US Navy
CDR Richard J. Cheeseman, US Navy
LtCol Samuel B. Clonts, US Marine Corps
Col Mark A. Cooter, US Air Force
Mr. John E. DeFoor, Department of Defense
MAJ David W. Gardner, US Army
MAJ Clair Gill, US Army
Ms. Lisa D. Grice, Department of State
Lt Col Mark A Hering, US Air Force
Maj John M. Klein, US Air Force
Maj Christopher J. Larson, US Air Force
Maj Brian K. Livergood, US Air Force
MAJ John P. Lloyd, US Army
LCDR Michael D. Lockett, US Navy
Maj John K. Lussier, US Air Force
LtCol Michael P. Mahaney, US Marine Corps
LTC Neil J. Makepeace, UK
Maj Matteo G. Martemucci, US Air Force
Col Patrick A. McClelland, US Air Force
Mr. Blair J. McFarland, National Security Agency
Lt Col Timothy S. Mundy, US Marine Corps
Ms. Suzanne T. Neal, Defense Intelligence Agency
Maj Jose H. Ocasio-Santiago, US Army
CDR Robert E. Rasmussen, US Navy
COL Robert M. Roth, US Army
LCDR Christopher M. Senenko, US Navy
Mr. Anthony K. Stapleton, Department of State
LCDR Thomas J. Stuhleyer, US Coast Guard
COL Robert A. Warburg, US Army
COL Shawn A. Welch, US Army National Guard

**Title:**

“The Role of the Geographic Combatant Commander in Counterproliferation of Nuclear Weapons”

Author:

Bradford W. Baker
Lieutenant Commander
United States Navy

Abstract:

Because of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons and the increasing potential for proliferation to antagonistic countries, it is imperative that the United States lead an active campaign of counterproliferation around the world. In order to achieve effective counterproliferation initiatives, all elements of national power must be employed including diplomatic, information, military, and economic resources. Counterproliferation initiatives must include joint military forces, governmental agencies, and international organizations and must be adaptable to region-specific issues due to the widespread differences in ideology and capability. This paper reviews current and past doctrine on counterproliferation as well initiatives used to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper then reviews the basic technology behind nuclear weapons and nuclear energy in order to define the difference between the two that can be used to improve existing doctrine. Three counterproliferation case studies, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and North Korea, are analyzed to demonstrate the differences that exist in counterproliferation scenarios. This paper then divides proliferation into three stages and discuss actions by Geographic Combatant Commanders in each stage to dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat counterproliferation in any scenario.

Keywords:

Counterproliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction



Title:

“The U.S. Organization and Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Lessons Observed and Future Possibilities”

Author:

David L. Baudoin
Commander
United States Navy

Abstract:

This paper analyzes and compares the strategy and organizational composition of Al Qaeda (AQ) and networked Islamic terrorist organizations against the U.S. organization and strategy for combating terrorism.

AQ and affiliates is a network operating in at least 60 countries with the goal of a revived caliphate. Despite U.S. efforts, AQ continues to masterfully recruit, train, finance, and provide logistics for their entire network. As a networked non-state actor, AQ poses challenges that the U.S. national security apparatus is not well designed to handle. The institutionalized and stove-piped U.S. interagency architecture has created a cumbersome process through which the elements of national power are wielded, and the structure through which the U.S. combats terrorism is a subset. As such, the operational seams created by a stove-piped organizational construct avert the requisite agility, speed and synchronization needed to execute effective actions in combating terror.

The agility and speed needed to produce broad spectrum solutions to combat terror will require updated authorities, capabilities, and responsibilities. The U.S. national security apparatus will benefit from an information age National Security Act. Enabling the U.S. efforts in combating terror to be more effective.

Keywords:

Combating Terrorism, Counter Terrorism, National Security Apparatus, Al Qaeda

**Title:**

“Shaping China’s Development: Stable Growth of an Asia-Pacific Might”

Author:

Christopher L. Bennett
Major
United States Air Force

Abstract:

Over the past 30 years, China has emerged from an isolationist, introverted state into a global economic and political power. This growth has allowed China to expand its military, reaching a level of “near-peer” competitor to the U.S., yet that growth is shrouded in mystery and uncertainty. The U.S. must strive to ascertain China’s future intentions, and develop a strategy that prepares for two possibilities, peaceful engagement with a prosperous China, and response to an aggressive and militant China. The global environment has changed since the end of the Cold War, and even though the United States is still the dominant global superpower, its influence is waning. The Asia-Pacific region, stretching from Japan to Australia to the Indian Ocean to Central Asia, is a vast expanse with a large, diverse population supporting the gamut of social, economic, religious, and governmental constructs.

The U.S. is a “Pacific nation,” but must rely upon allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region to commit to “burden-sharing” to maintain security and stability. Keeping key allies and partners aligned with the U.S. is much more challenging in today’s globalized world, and the complex and interdependent nature of the Asia-Pacific region adds to the difficulty. The U.S. needs to adapt its strategy towards dealing with regional allies, and do so with the combined efforts of all of the elements of national power, promoting the military component needed for security, while also enhancing its efforts in other areas. The U.S. needs to continue, or in certain cases, initiate engaging and cooperative dialogue, even with sometimes troublesome nations such as North Korea. Additionally, doing so in both a bilateral and multilateral construct will bring about the most positive benefits of international diplomacy, and thus further promote security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Keywords:

China, Asia-Pacific Security, South-East Asia

**Title:**

“The Department of Defense Net-Centric Data Strategy: Implementation Requires a Joint Community of Interest (COI) Working Group and a Joint COI Oversight Council”

Author:

Clinton R. Bigger
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Army

Abstract:

In 2003, the ASD(NII) DoD CIO published the DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy, providing guidance to DoD Components for the development of policies and practices to improve data sharing. The objective of this strategy is to make data more visible, accessible, and understandable to users of the Global Information Grid (GIG). The stated goal of the strategy is to empower users through faster access to data by posting data prior to processing. The DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy provides a middle management approach to data management through Communities of Interest (COI), the reuse of discovery and content metadata, and use of GIG Enterprise Services (GES). COIs will be responsible for the development of data sharing capabilities in developing Information Technology programs, and are encouraged to reuse metadata previously registered by other COIs. The results of a 2006 Progress and Compliance Report, completed by the ASD(NII) DoD CIO, document progress on the part of Mission Areas and DoD Components in creating COIs and establishing data sharing policies. However, in four key findings, the report documented areas that require attention by the DoD to achieve the goals of the DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy. Analysis of the report demonstrates a decentralized approach to developing data sharing policy has emerged and additional guidance is required to ensure DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy goals are met. To effectively implement the strategy, a Joint COI Working Group and Joint COI Oversight Council should be established to provide unity of effort to the creation of DoD data sharing policy and the development of discovery and content metadata standards.

Keywords:

DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy, Communities of Interest, Metadata, Defense Acquisition



Title:

“Response to a Chemical Incident or Accident - Who is In Charge?”

Author:

Darryl J. Briggs
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Army

Abstract:

This paper explores and recommends a new strategy in the response to a chemical accident. Combatant Commanders and the Services must have specific guidance and appropriate authorities to be able to effectively manage a Chemical Accident and Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) at a chemical stockpile site. This paper also explores three separate organizations: Department of Army, Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, and the Department of Homeland Security. In each one of these organizations, the background, authority, current policy and procedures, and other topics are discussed and analyzed. Following the research and analysis, this paper provides some recommendations to possibly improve the preparedness and response to an event at a chemical stockpile site.

Keywords:

Chemical Stockpile Site, Chemical Surety, CSEPP



Title:

“Developing a Whole-of-Government Approach to Complex Problems”

Author:

Andrew Burton
Wing Commander
Royal Air Force

Abstract:

National security policy objectives, both in the U.S. and the UK, will be met more effectively and efficiently if a truly cross-governmental approach to complex operations is developed and implemented. At the strategic level, failure by the U.S. to achieve adequate unity of effort was one cause of the failure to produce an adequate plan for the post-combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. At the operational level, an imbalance in resources between the military and other departments results in the situation that only the military is capable of taking effective action. A top-down solution that modifies the current Unified Command Plan to allow for the formation of whole-of-government operational level commands in lieu of military COCOMs (or PJHQ) is required. A review of the whole of the national security architecture, that redefines roles and missions, and allocates resources, is required to support the change.

Keywords: COCOM, PJHQ, Unified Command Plan, whole-of-government approach

**Title:**

“The Evolution of Phase Zero Shaping and Interagency Integration in Combatant Commander Campaign Planning”

Author:

Anthony P. Chatham
Commander
United States Navy

Abstract:

Shaping is an evolving concept. Although it has been added to campaign planning as described in the campaign phasing model, the doctrine fails to adequately define shaping as a distinct category of activities. If shaping is to be something more than security cooperation, security assistance or diplomacy, it needs to be defined in terms of how it is different, whom it is intended to shape, what is to be shaped and how shaping is to be resourced. The joint doctrine is also clear that shaping activities are to be coordinated and integrated with the IA. If within the DOD shaping is not clearly understood, as I propose, then the DOD is not ready for IA and/or international coordination and integration. Without a common understanding of terminology, intentions and resources required to implement shaping, more security cooperation and security assistance is all that will result. As shaping relates to multinational coordination, we cannot hope for more from our international partners until we have done significant work at home first.

Keywords: Shaping, Phase Zero, Campaign Planning



Title:

“Engaging North Korea: An Element of the Global War on Terrorism”

Author:

Richard J. Cheeseman, Jr.
Commander
United States Navy

Abstract:

The North Korean nuclear weapons issue has culminated in a climactic standoff between this ill-equipped and undernourished nation and the rest of the world. Kim Jong Il has continued to defy the world community regarding missile testing and the desire to possess nuclear weapons. With North Korea becoming a confirmed nuclear power, the potential for radical instability in the Northeast Asian region exists to a greater degree than ever seen before in the post-Cold War era. The challenge for the United States and the world community is exactly how to handle this possibly disastrous turn of events. The Bush Administration policy of preemption when required, and the aggressive nature of its rhetoric regarding rogue states, may have caused North Korea to feel as if it may be the next battlefield enemy for the United States, and hence continue its missile and nuclear weapons testing. With the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and continued operations in Iraq, it is imperative that the United States avoid another military crisis. A diplomatic solution must be seriously explored and would be in concert with American published strategic documents from the highest levels. Beginning a line of bilateral negotiations with North Korea outside of the Six-Party Talks will allow the United States to meet its strategic goals related to the GWOT that apply to the Korean peninsula, including the elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat.

Keywords:

North Korea, Six-Party Talks, Bilateral Negotiations, DPRK Nuclear Threat, United States Strategy

**Title:**

“Elements of the Iraqi Insurgency and the Role of Security for Achieving Victory in Iraq”

Author:

Sam B. Clonts, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Marine Corps

Abstract:

The extreme violence of the Iraqi insurgency has continued unabated despite the determination of the U.S. and Iraqi forces. The continued violence has prevented full implementation of the U.S. “Victory in Iraq” strategy. The strategy is built upon three inter-related platforms of economic development, political engagement and national security. The threat to domestic and national security serves as a major obstacle to reconstruction and the eventual withdrawal of coalition forces. The U.S. military strategy has focused on eliminating the insurgent networks. This policy has failed in that the insurgents are more active and lethal than in any time previous. A policy change that focuses on individual root causes and then addresses each cause accordingly will be more flexible than the current policy that assumes a monolithic view of the Iraq insurgency. This thesis argues the insurgency is not monolithic and can be dissected along a number of different variables in order to better approach each insurgent sub-group. An in-depth examination is conducted of three principal groups, the Sunnis, Shiites, and the impact of crime on Iraq. Based on this policy of separation, recommendations to achieve a greater degree of national security are proposed.

Keywords:

Iraq, Insurgency and the Role of Security, victory in Iraq



Title:

“Airborne Armed Full Motion Video: the Nexus of Ops/Intel Integration in the Joint/Coalition Environment”

Author:

Mark A. Cooter,
Colonel
United States Air Force

Abstract:

Operations and intelligence organizations continue to struggle with how to best plan and employ assets with a video capability. Many heated debates have occurred concerning manned and unmanned as well as armed and unarmed assets. This friction caused the less than optimum utilization of these assets. In today’s Global War on Terrorism, timely, detailed intelligence is ever more critical to mission success. In many cases, operational commanders do not conduct their operations unless they are assured the availability of airborne full motion video (FMV) assets. The thesis of this paper argues the Department of Defense must adopt changes in joint doctrine, terms, organizations, and processes concerning armed, FMV capable platforms in order to employ FMV capabilities with greater operational effectiveness and efficiency.

Keywords:

FMV, UAVs, predators, global hawks

**Title:**

“Strategic Decision Games: Improving Strategic Intuition”

Author:

John E. DeFoor

Department of Defense

Abstract:

Emerging research into how decisions are made in real world situations indicates that they are made through a synthesis of analysis and intuition. Joint doctrine recognizes intuition but overwhelmingly emphasizes analytical methods. The joint community has ample guidance and receives training and education in support of analytical decision making. However, there is significantly less guidance, training, and education for intuitive decision making. Research has shown that the best preparation for intuitive decision making is relevant real-world experience and feedback. The nature of decision making at the strategic level of war makes gaining this experience problematic. Fortunately, decision making theory illuminates leverage points that can be used to enhance intuitive decision making expertise. Equally useful, practical methods demonstrated at the tactical level can be adapted to address this problem at the strategic level. Strategic decision games should be used to improve the national security professional’s strategic intuition.

Keywords:

Decision Making, Intuition, Decision Game

**Title:**

“Clarifying Relationships between Objectives, Effects and End States with Illustrations and Lessons from the Vietnam War”

Author:

David W. Gardner
Major
U.S. Army

Abstract:

This paper examines the roles and relationships of objectives, effects and end states across the strategic and operational levels of war in order to provide greater clarity for campaign planners. With its inclusion in the recently updated joint doctrine on planning, the effects-based approach to operations attempts to capture the latest insights on warfare. Unfortunately, the new joint doctrine fails to clearly articulate its advantages and scope of applicability, allows inconsistencies internal to itself and with previous doctrine to remain, and causes confusion in formerly well-understood concepts. With the goal of providing a more consistent framework than that offered by joint doctrine, this study, supported by lessons from the Vietnam War, examines why the nesting of objectives, effects and end states must be understood in order to successfully design campaigns to achieve strategic ends.

Keywords:

Objectives, Effects, End States, Operational Design, Campaign Planning

**Title:**

“SOF: A Joint Force Integrator”

Author:

Clair A. Gill

Major

United States Army

Abstract:

The 2006 QDR points to a globalized environment that is clouded by catastrophic, disruptive, and irregular threats, which necessitate a national security strategy that not only offers military solutions, but incorporates the joint, interagency and multinational communities as well. However, the military is currently the only organization sourced and manned to lead this integrated effort to protect, prevent and prevail. In the context of today’s operational environment, the military is often viewed pejoratively and should only be used when all other means have failed.

This paper argues that special operations forces offer an incremental option in which military capabilities exist, but the presence is minimized, if not transparent. SOF offer unique skill sets, both kinetic and non-kinetic, that can shape the environment, integrate Joint forces, and conduct tactical actions with strategic results.

The United States’ Special Operations Forces must develop mutually interdependent relationships with conventional forces, multinational partners and interagency forces, and therein synchronize both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts throughout the operational environment to defeat its enemies and achieve the national strategic objectives.

Keywords:

Special Operations, Joint Operations

**Title:**

“D.I.M.E.F.I.L.: A Worldwide Campaign for Life”

Author:

Lisa Grice

U.S. Department of State

Abstract:

Countering the trend of suicide bombings requires not only changing the mindset of the potential bomber, but ensuring terrorist organizations which use such methods will incur painful costs. In order to understand what could deter the suicide bomber it was necessary to conduct a study on the profile and the motivating factors of the bomber. What motivates the bomber to kill him or herself? The motivating factors of a suicide bomber are the organization which recruits the bomber, religion, societal influences, politics and nationalism. The motivating factors for a female are very similar to the male, but most commonly women want to avenge an injustice such as the death or injury of a family member or friend or a rape or assault inflicted upon them. Whatever the motivating factor women, more so than men, generate media coverage. Research indicates that some suicide bombers can be deterred through diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement (D.I.M.E.F.I.L.) means, but these elements cannot stop suicide attacks. If these means of national power are not used as an ongoing method of deterrence, another 9/11 on U.S soil is a strong possibility.

Keywords:

Suicide bombing, DIMEFIL

**Title:**

“Flexible Precision: Air Force’s Answer to Army Transformation and Intratheater Airlift on the 21st Century Battlefield”

Author:

Mark A. Hering
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United States Air Force

Abstract:

The changing operational environment has motivated the Army to undergo its largest transformation since WWII. The Army decision to procure the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) has rekindled the “roles and missions” debate that first surfaced soon after the Air Force stood up as a separate service. Both the Army and the Air Force have a legitimate requirement to recapitalize—the average age of Army cargo aircraft is over twenty years old and the average age of active duty Air Force C-130s are almost thirty-five years old. The significant increase in capability of the JCA compared to current Army cargo aircraft is the source of the current “roles and missions” debate.

This paper offers a solution to meeting intratheater airlift requirements that support the Army’s recent transformation. History is full of examples where the intratheater airlift community has embraced new technologies or modified operational procedures in order to overcome evolving threats and resupply troops in the field. The situation today is no different. Today the Air Force can employ Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) technology to resupply ground forces, as well as On-Call Airdrop, a time-sensitive employment capability for airlift that adopts procedures currently used by the Close Air Support (CAS) community.

The thesis of this paper is to add the concept of *Flexible Precision* as a USAF fixed-wing distinctive capability to enhance the JFC’s ability to meet war-fighter logistical needs and allow the Air Force to continue as the intratheater airlift provider for Army requirements on the 21st century battlefield.

Keywords:

Intratheater Airlift, Transformation, Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS), Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)



Title:

“Eyes to See: The Foothold of Jihadi Underpinnings”

Author:

John M. Klein, Jr.

Major

United States Air Force

Abstract:

The magnitude of the Jihadi threat confronting the West goes largely unrecognized because of Western civilization’s unwillingness to explore the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct. These underpinnings are well-established and rigorously authenticated precepts that serve as a foothold for Jihadi conduct, making Islam a ready-made ideology that suits the Jihadis’ insatiable goals for territorial conquest and a religious-based totalitarian government. The West’s disinclination towards exploring these underpinnings is partly due to its entrapment within a self-referencing inward spiral of cognition that blinds it to the genuine intentions of its Jihadi foes. Likewise, the Jihadis are trapped within an expanding outward spiral of cognition based upon a system of unyielding and self-legitimizing expansionist concepts. Preventing the eclipse of Western civilization is dependent upon the West’s timely recognition of the revolutionary Jihadi vanguard as a peril to its existence.

This paper first demonstrates how the West is unwilling to recognize the threat it faces because of political correctness and an uncontested intellectual emasculation. These elements forge a mirror-image perception of the enemy that has created a self-referencing lexicon in the war on terrorism. As the West’s lead agent in the war on terrorism, the United States Government has failed to accurately define the threat it faces, thereby creating disparate efforts in quelling Jihadi exertions. The second part of this paper discusses the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct, their fixed nature, and how they are being used as a foothold to carry out a long-term campaign for world domination. Lastly, this paper highlights the magnitude of the Jihadi threat and how the West must fully awaken in order to posture for survival.

Keywords:

Jihad, Muslim, Islam, political correctness, Quran, Koran, hadith, progressive revelation, dar al-Islam, submission, vanguard, Islamic revolution.

**Title:**

“China’s Energy Security and its Military Modernization Efforts: How China Plans to Dominate the World”

Author:

Christopher J. Larson
Major
United States Air Force

Abstract:

This report examines China’s increasing demand for energy and how that demand has the potential to threaten the stability of China’s Communist Party regime. It illustrates that China’s demand for energy will continue to grow and that China will become increasingly reliant on oil imports to meet its energy needs. This reliance on oil imports has forced China, in the short term, to adopt an energy security strategy that seeks to protect its access to oil by adopting a non-threatening military posture complemented by use of its economic bargaining power. At the same time, China has adopted a long range strategy, that runs side-by-side with the short-term strategy, of “bide our time and build up our capabilities.” This long-term strategy consists of a “string of pearls” approach to gain the necessary forward bases to secure its energy lifeline and the development of asymmetric military capabilities. The ultimate goal of this long-term strategy is to develop sufficient military capability to challenge the West and achieve great power status.

Keywords:

China, energy needs



Title:

“Joint Space Forces in Theater: Coordination is no Longer Sufficient”

Author:

Brian K. Livergood
Major
United States Air Force

Abstract:

The role of space operations in the United States military has matured significantly since the end of the Cold War. The transformation from strategic applications to tactical integration has increased the demands for effects achievable through joint space capabilities on and off the battlefield. The explosive growth of and demand for joint space capabilities have outstripped the joint community’s ability to provide unifying doctrine and a command and control structure to meet the demands. Consequently, the military services have independently developed solutions and doctrine to meet the needs of their respective joint force component commander.

The thesis of this paper is the US military must create a jointly focused command and control organization to meet the Joint Force Commander’s growing demand for synchronized joint space capabilities. Although joint doctrine addresses the need for a space coordinating authority (SCA) separate from a commander to achieve space superiority, it does not provide sufficient joint authority to effectively execute the SCA role. Consequently, the Joint Force Air Component Commander has attempted to combine the roles in the Joint Air Operations Center resulting in a less than optimum integration of space into US joint warfighting.

To establish clear lines of authority and enable a joint forces wide perspective of space power, a Joint Space Synchronization Authority supported by a Joint Space Synchronization Officer, Theater Space Integration Cell, and Joint Space Superiority Cell is proposed. While these organizations could operate independently of each other at different locations, the greatest synergy is obtained by co-locating them in a Joint Space Integration Division in the JAOC. This construct allows for a jointly recognized and focused approach to space force synchronization and integration across all components.

Keywords:

Space operations, space command and control, space coordinating authority, JFACC, AOC, Air Operations Center

**Title:**

“Developing a Joint Engineer Headquarters for the JTF Commander”

Author:

John P. Lloyd

Major

United States Army

Abstract:

The degree to which Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders are responsible for full spectrum operations encompasses a greater need for a standing Joint Engineer Force Headquarters which is capable of providing command and control of engineer forces for greater operational effectiveness from initial entry operations to nation building. This paper is intended to expound on Engineer Transformation and specifically discuss the idea of establishing a standing Joint Engineer Force Headquarters with the ability to better provide the unique capabilities that engineers from all services possess.

The Joint Engineer Headquarters concept is a step to show that a more responsive and deployable C2 structure is needed. Based on current conditions in the world the engineers in the various services will need to start thinking more joint and how the engineer force can better serve the JTF Commander. It will be a struggle similar to the Goldwater – Nicholas Act was. Once the engineer regiment decides to do this, its capability will far exceed its current operating structure.

Keywords:

Joint Engineering, Engineer, Engineer Strategy

**Title:**

“An Analytical Approach to Prioritizing the Development of Seabasing Components”

Author:

Michael D. Lockett
Lieutenant Commander
United States Navy

Abstract:

A fully-developed Seabasing capability would be of substantial value to the Joint Force commander, enhancing the Joint Force’s freedom of action and significantly improving its agility in support of national military and strategic objectives. It would reduce the time from decision to action by eliminating the need to build supplies ashore before starting operations, enable the Joint Force to act without the political constraints of friendly host nation access, and defer the time until the Joint Force commander must have a large supply base ashore to continue operations. The two main challenges to the full implementation of Seabasing are that the equipment required is expensive and that several critical pieces of technology required do not yet exist. Because of this, an incremental approach to developing and fielding Seabasing technologies is the most fiscally and strategically responsible plan. This study helps to enlighten the choices required for this incremental approach by demonstrating a method to analytically compare various building block technologies. Potential solutions in four key capability areas are analyzed for their relative value to Seabasing, value to the Joint Force in other areas, procurement cost, and technological development status. The results of this analysis are reviewed to provide prioritized recommendations on how to efficiently allocate scarce budgetary resources towards the various programs that are needed to fully realize the Seabasing concept.

Keywords:

Seabasing, Transformation



Title:

“Paradigmatic Entrapment”

Author:

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Major

United States Air Force

Abstract:

With the onset of the 21st century, new threats have emerged throughout the world that seek non-traditional means to attack the United States. In an effort to characterize possible non-traditional threats, the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, recognized that one future challenge of the United States could be from an enemy who employs disruptive technologies that negate current U.S. advantages. To meet this threat, a concept defined as paradigmatic entrapment provides an avenue for thinking about the problems an organization faces when an enemy employs disruptive technologies as an architecture in war. While developing operational art, military leadership must understand the danger of the phenomenon of paradigmatic entrapment and develop strategies to effectively deal with it.

Using historical examples from World War I involving the French and German armies, the concept of paradigms and how they develop within an organization is explored. By examining the French army development leading up to the start of the war, a model is proposed that describes how a paradigm is developed and matures within an organization. Strategies for dealing with the phenomenon are developed for current military leadership by exploring the actions taken by German leadership near the end of the war that resulted in the German army overcoming its mature paradigm. By focusing on organizational processes, lessons learned from the historical examples are applicable to organizations faced with disruptive technologies both now and into the future.

Keywords:

Paradigm, Organizational Change, Innovation, World War I, Disruptive Technology

**Title:**

“Pursuing Strategic Goals: Resources, Technology, Political Will, and the Global War on Terrorism”

Author:

Michael P. Mahaney
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Marine Corps

Abstract:

Strategic goals are developed and approved by the President of the United States with input from his close advisors, staff and administration officials. These strategic goals form the foundation that subordinate agencies, departments, and military planners use to develop strategic objectives that support the overarching desired national goals. A clear understanding of desired goals and endstate is imperative at the strategic level to ensure that all elements of national power are applied effectively. For the military, clear delineation of strategic goals and endstate is imperative to ensure force can be effectively and efficiently applied when necessary to enable strategic success.

Current United States Armed Forces military doctrine recognizes three levels of war; tactical, operational, and strategic. These three levels overlap. Planning and execution at each level is reliant on planning and execution in other levels. Clearly delineated strategic goals form the nucleus from which military plans at all levels evolve. Proper or improper identification of strategic goals affects how military leaders plan and utilize military power to support the attainment of strategic objectives. An incorrect interpretation of a strategic goal can lead to the failure to accomplish the desired strategic goal.

Some have argued that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) lacks a sound strategy, in part reflected in the lack of strategic objectives for the military. Specifically, issues have been raised regarding Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and what appear to be lack of clearly defined national strategic goals.

Proper development and continual assessment of strategic goals will directly impact the military campaign planner and can ultimately determine the success or failure of the mission. The success or failure of the military mission will ultimately impact the success or failure of the overarching national strategy.

Keywords:

Strategic goals, campaign plans, GWOT, strategic objectives



Title:

“The U.S. Freedom Agenda in the Middle East”

Author:

Neil J. Makepeace
Lieutenant Colonel
U.K. Army

Abstract:

The Bush Administration’s foreign policy has comprised three key components: security through forward defence; a black-and-white view of the post-9/11 world; and, most pervasively, the so-called *freedom agenda*. These elements combine in an approach that many see as imperious and detached from on-the-ground realities. The thesis of this paper is that the United States requires a more balanced and realistic policy agenda in the Middle East, which discards the strident promotion of constitutional democracy in favour of a less imperious approach based on values that are meaningful to Middle Eastern people and societies. Revised U.S. policies and supporting strategies should reflect the complex and volatile relationship between the Western and Islamic worlds. Some analyses suggest that their clash is inevitable, while others offer hope for an “alliance of civilizations.” Such an alliance would require a concerted effort to reconcile Western and Islamic ideologies, which do not appear to be wholly incompatible. The United States and her allies must seek, through their policies and actions in the Middle East, to empower Muslims who advocate moderate interpretations of the Islamic texts. Radical Islamists and so-called Jihadi fighters must be denied theological credibility. The U.S. agenda in the Middle East should also attempt to empower moderate and liberalizing political influences in the region. Middle Eastern regimes occupy a broad spectrum and many are undertaking cautious programmes of liberalization. Political Islam is an increasingly important feature of this social and political landscape. Islamist political parties should be encouraged to operate in the mainstream of politics and to exert moderating influences over their followers. Thus, the United States should discard her strident promotion of constitutional democracy in favour of more carefully focused encouragement of social, economic and political reform in the Middle East. This paper offers a set of 16 recommendations that represent a more realistic and balanced agenda in the Middle East.

Keywords:

Middle Eastern democracy, freedom agenda, Muslim governments

**Title:**

“Regaining the High Ground: The Challenges of Perception Management in National Strategy and Military Operations”

Author:

Matteo G. Martemucci
Major
United States Air Force

Abstract:

The informational element of power may be the most elusive for the U.S. Government to wield, but its importance is proportional to its difficulty. With the rise in global terrorist networks and a precipitous decline in world opinion of America’s foreign policy, Perception Management is more critical now than at any time in America’s history. This paper attempts to answer the question of why, in this time of conflict, it is so difficult for the U.S. Government to effectively leverage the informational element of power. It explores three friction-inducing elements that afflict the U.S. Government, including the military. The U.S. Government’s politics & personalities, bureaucracy, and aversion to the use of mass media, even in time of war, have precluded an integrated Perception Management campaign.

A historical review of Perception Management strategies since World War I reveals that this difficulty is based largely on individual personalities, an ever-growing bureaucracy, and a historical American concern about the perceived manipulation of the media by its government. To solve this problem, the President must clearly define lines of authority regarding the Government’s Perception Management strategy. He must also give that authority to a strong leader capable of coordinating the disparate efforts of numerous Government agencies. Finally, the U.S. Government must take a more proactive approach to media engagement as part of an integrated strategic Perception Management campaign.

Keywords:

Perception Management, Strategic Communication, Information Operations, National Strategy

**Title:**

“The United States National Security Strategy: Grand Strategy or Propaganda?”

Author:

Patrick A. McClelland
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Air Force

Abstract:

Within academic and military strategy circles, it is widely accepted that the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) is America’s grand strategy. However, the extent to which there is widespread misuse, misunderstanding and disagreement on the meaning of grand strategy is inconceivable at times. The ambivalent attitude about a common, coherent understanding of the concept of grand strategy, which pervades the writings of both experts and students of strategic thought, is a cavalier approach to a crucial aspect of America’s successful future. In the first chapter the paper establishes a foundation of terminology to provide continuity throughout the work. The terms national interest, elements of national power, grand strategy and national security are discussed and definitions provided. Subsequently, the study reviews the history of relevant Congressional actions to explore historical perspectives and determine whether grand strategy was in the mind of Congressional leaders when they levied the requirement for a National Security Strategy. Finally, using the previous chapters as a foundation, the paper critically analyzes the issues of Congressional intent, pluralism, and the National Security Strategy as propaganda. Through the analysis this study suggests that, by definition and intent, the United States National Security Strategy is not grand strategy and treating it as such has negative implications for the US in the post-Cold War new world order.

Keywords:

National Strategy, Grand Strategy, National Security Strategy



Title:

“Solving Wireless Communications Interoperability Problems Among Emergency First Responders Depends on Greater National Guard Involvement”

Author:

Blair J. McFarland
GS-13
Department of Defense

Abstract:

Interoperable first responder wireless communications are a key strategic requirement for effectively and efficiently responding to and recovering from man made and natural disasters. Recent major events provide examples of the unnecessary loss of lives and severe confusion in which lack of interoperability played a significant role. The most successful initiatives to fix the interoperability problem are not top down federal approaches. Rather, they result from local and state personnel driving the solutions that work not only in locally handled incidents but also in larger emergencies.

An effective national strategy for improving the first responder wireless communications interoperability problems depends on greater emphasis on the National Guard role in proactively interfacing with local first responders to better understand the current state of the dynamic communications environment. A National Guard situation awareness cell at each JFHQ-State, focused on first responder wireless communications interoperability within the state, is key to improving emergency response during the next national crisis.

Keywords:

National Guard, JFHQ-State, First Responders, national disasters

**Title:**

“The applicability of the Effects-Based Approach for Planning at the Different Levels of War.”

Author:

Timothy S. Mundy
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Marine Corps

Abstract:

The vast technological advantage United States forces enjoy over competitors has led to several beliefs among theorists regarding the changes occurring in the application of military power. Many believe the fact that the United States has no current peer competitor allows it to further exploit technological advantages to the point of changing the very nature of war. The emerging construct of effects-based approach to operations, when applied at a higher end of the full spectrum of warfare, may prove too limited for use by Joint planners at the strategic-operational level. This construct hinges on an unrealistic knowledge of the enemy and an assumption that the nature of future war is predisposed to solutions resulting from precision application of military power with minimal casualties and destruction. This contrasts against classic theorists’ ideas about the nature of war. Prussian theorist Von Clausewitz wrote about a persuasive and enduring friction in war, but modern theorists believe technology provides the means of overcoming friction. Another faulty assumption is that a future peer competitor will not be able to negate U.S. technological superiority; a cornerstone of assumed information dominance and key to effects-based approaches.

From its origins, it is apparent effects-based operations represent at their essence a targeteering approach to warfare. It is particularly useful at the tactical level, where attacking various components of an enemy’s structurally complex infrastructure proves successful. There is an understandable logic in selecting not all potential targets, but only those that if neutralized or destroyed will cause a cascading, crippling effect across the enemy’s system. However, with greater complexity at the operational and strategic levels of war—because of the mix of tangible and intangible elements—effects-based operations do not prove as useful because of the ever-present uncertainties, friction, and unpredictable human elements. Errors made in determining nodes and links in highly complex situations and systems, as well as the enemy’s contrary will, can cause predicted effects to be wrong.

The effects-based approach has some value at the tactical level of war, and may assist planners in expressing measure effectively as an aid to assessment in military operations. However, the push for the effects-based approach into all levels of military planning and in all circumstances attempts to force a planning construct that proves limited at the strategic-operational nexus.

Keywords:

Effects-based operations, effects-based approach, rapid decisive operations.



Title:

“Understanding the Enemy”

Author:

Suzanne Tracy Neal
Defense Intelligence Agency

Abstract:

This study defines the nature of the war on terrorism by assessing the definition of terrorism itself; why terrorism exists, and develops an analytical framework within which to assess United States political strategies towards terrorist actors and organizations. It seeks to define terrorism and terrorists; to provide an understanding of Islamic reasons leading to current-day Jihad; the concept of nationalism in majority Muslim states; and give visibility to a new way ahead in Iraq, potentially leading to regional stability. This new strategy requires aggressive implementation by the United States, the west and key state actors in the Middle East to ensure victory in the Global War on Terrorism.

**Title:**

“Executing Host Nation Elections in a Post-Conflict Environment: The CJTF’s Role”

Author:

Jose H. Ocasio-Santiago

Major

United States Army

Abstract:

The US Military and the US government have highlighted that elections are a critical element in the success of post-conflict operations and the transitioning of a host nation to a democratic form of governance. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) are often required to support or lead host nation elections to facilitate the transition of a host nation to a representative form of government. In the last two major US conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan), CJTFs along with the host nation have been the main effort for the planning, preparation and execution of the elections. Prior to these conflicts, the international community led by UN and NGO entities, were primarily leading the electoral process. In the future, the military should be prepared to lead or support actions for the elections in the event the non-governmental and international organizations cannot support an election process. There is no well-defined civil military framework for a CJTF to prepare and execute elections. Whenever possible, CJTFs should take a supporting role to the execution of elections to present an unbiased approach to the process. This paper focuses on the framework necessary for a CJTF to execute or support elections in a post-conflict environment.

Keywords:

Host nation elections, Iraq, Afghanistan, Post-conflict Operations, MNC-I, MNF-I, CJTF-

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**Title:**

“The Wrong Target: Problem of Mistargeting Resulting in Fratricide and Civilian Casualties”

Author:

Robert E. Rasmussen
Commander
United States Navy

Abstract:

Despite a considerable effort since Operation Desert Storm, the Services have yet to reduce the likelihood of mistargeting – the engagement of friendly forces and non-combatants by friendly fire. Mistargeting has always occurred but has historically received little scrutiny. The number of mistargeting casualties has gone down dramatically, but the rate has gone up since World War II. When tactical mistargeting occurs today, the effects can be enormous and are increasing, particularly given modern global media.

There are thousands of U.S. military entities that potentially require Combat Identification (CID), plus coalition partners and neutrals. CID of aircraft and ships has historically received proportionally more attention compared to ground units, which suffer the greatest cost of mistargeting.

Despite impressive technological advances, there is currently no universal system for positive identification of friendly forces or hostile targets. U.S. and coalition forces have an increasing reliance on the accuracy of information to locate and positively identify targets. Aircraft are more dependent on external sources for precise targeting data, and weapons are increasingly being dropped “on coordinates” provided by off board sensors and sources, increasing the risk of mistargeting. Modern precision weapon capabilities have outpaced the military’s ability to differentiate positively between friend, neutral, and foe, and to locate desired targets precisely.

Keywords:

Mistargeting, CID, combat identification, friendly fire, fratricide

**Title:**

“Foreign Policy Effects on Strategic Communications and the Ability to Influence”

Author:

Robert M. Roth
Colonel
United States Army

Abstract:

This paper provides an analytical analysis of how the United States Government conducted strategic communications from post World War II until the end of the Cold War with the former Soviet Union. In the post Cold War environment, the paper continues to analyze how the U.S. Government conducted strategic communications into the 21st Century without an executive agency to lead this very important form of national power. The discussion leads to an understanding of how deeds and words are inseparable when communicating with the global community, and how policymakers must understand the perceptions of the global community in order to develop effective policies that serve the mutual interests of the U.S. and the region for which the policy is intended. Regardless of the message we try to send, our deeds must match our words in order to communicate and ultimately influence the global community through dialogue. However, with the deactivation of the U.S. Information Agency the leaders in the United States have all but lost their ability to communicate with the international public. As a result, the U.S. fails to lead the global community as the champion of human rights in the struggle against militant religious extremism. This has resulted in the loss of a critical vulnerability within the U.S. Government at a time when the U.S. is attempting to fight an enemy whose base of support is primarily ideological. The paper concludes with a discussion and recommendation on how better to organize and use Informational Power within the U.S. Government.

Keywords:

Strategic Communications, Foreign Policy-making, Use of Media to influence, COCOM support



Title:

“Network Centric Warfare and the Principles of War”

Author:

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United States Navy

Abstract:

A central pillar of future warfighting concepts for the United States military is the idea of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). This new approach to military operations attempts to leverage Information Age innovations and apply them to the execution of warfare. Some advocates of this concept believe that it will change the character and nature of warfare, therefore, making the conventional concepts of warfare obsolete.

The principles of war are another way of referring to the conventional concepts and character of warfare. The United States military has adopted a standardized series of principles which have stood the test of time and can be traced back to many of the classical theorists of warfare such as the Prussian strategic theorist Carl Von Clausewitz and the ancient Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu. It is the principles that must be analyzed when determining whether or not NCW has radically altered the landscape of warfare. While NCW concepts are force enablers and will assist the military of the future in the execution of its mission, they do not radically alter the classic principles of warfare and for this reason they should not be considered the prime motivator for future resourcing and doctrinal decisions.

Keywords:

Network Centric Warfare, Principles of War, NCW, netcentric



Title:

“The Rule of Law and the U.S. Quest for Security in El Salvador”

Author:

Anthony K. Stapleton
U.S. Department of State

Abstract:

This paper examines U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in El Salvador from 1977 to the present. The study begins with a discussion of the theoretical and practical meanings of the rule of law and follows with an examination of the centrality of the concept in U.S. strategic thinking. Separate case studies examine U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in El Salvador in response to security threats ranging from human rights violations and insurgency to illegal immigration and transnational street gangs. The central argument of the paper is that under the rubric of promotion of the rule of law, the U.S. has unsuccessfully sought to eliminate threats to U.S. national security by trying to remedy fundamental flaws in the Salvadoran government. As such, U.S. rule of law promotion efforts in El Salvador must be seen as failed attempts at nation-building. Using the U.S. experience in El Salvador as a reference point, the paper reaches the conclusion that promoting the rule of law is not an effective means of addressing threats to U.S. national security.

Keywords:

Rule of law, U.S. foreign assistance, counterinsurgency, human rights, transnational street gangs, illegal immigration



Title:

“Maritime NORAD: Setting a Course for Success in Joint, Interagency, and Bi-National Maritime Homeland Security and Defense”

Author:

Thomas J. Stuhlreyer
Lieutenant Commander
United States Coast Guard

Abstract:

Since 9/11 much work has been done to improve our understanding of maritime traffic and activity in the maritime domain of North America. In May 2006 when the NORAD agreement was renewed by the U.S. and Canada, a maritime warning component was included. Since 1958 NORAD has provided the situational awareness of aerospace activity and homeland defense C2 that needs to be established and organized for the maritime environment. The new maritime component of NORAD provides an excellent opportunity to provide a comprehensive solution to the management of maritime homeland security (MHLS) and maritime homeland defense (MHLD). Numerous departments, services, agencies and at least one international partner, Canada, have a primary stake in this effort. Improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and developing MHLD and MHLS procedures is an ongoing national priority for both the U.S. and Canada and will benefit from the example of NORAD and its almost fifty years of aerospace defense. However, the maritime warning mission may be even more complex because of the nature and scope of maritime traffic and activity. To achieve success, NORAD needs to manage MHLS and MHLD command and control together, oversee the synchronization of North American MDA efforts, and utilize a flexible, interagency organization model, to coordinate operations and ensure seamless command and control.

Keywords:

Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, Maritime Domain Awareness, MDA

**Title:**

“A Decisive Point in the War On Terrorism”

Author:

Robert A. Warburg
Colonel
United States Army

Abstract:

Joint doctrine can better frame the critical factor of human dimension and the element of time in the joint operation planning process. Both are central in the War on Terrorism. To frame the discussion, the study examines the strategic aspect of culture and then considers the human terrain in military planning. The research reviews various narratives for the current strategic environment. The paper then examines the current transnational terrorist threat, its ideology, its goals, and its operational reach. The study then reviews current joint doctrine with a specific focus on how it frames the operational environment and how it employs time in the operational design process. It examines the AirLand Battle doctrine for its applicability to the War on Terrorism. Changes to the joint operational environment and operational design models are recommended.

Keywords:

Joint Doctrine, operational design, War on Terrorism, Joint Operations Planning Process

**Title:**

“Joint and Interdependent Requirements: A Case Study in Solving the Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities Gap”

Author:

Shawn Welch
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
United States Army National Guard

Abstract:

Current and programmed Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capabilities are insufficient to execute the Joint Forces Commander’s littoral operational missions against a highly advanced regional or near-peer competitor without unacceptable risk. Systemic deficiencies in the requirements generation process have resulted in overlooking major caliber guns as a potential solution for the challenges of long range NSFS to support deep Ship-to-Objective (STOM) maneuver. Failure to solve these deficiencies places strategic, operational and tactical operations at substantial risk. Recommendations are framed in an “ends,” “ways,” and “means” construct. The history of NSFS, current national strategy, joint and service specific doctrine, current and alternative capabilities associated with providing NSFS are evaluated against current attempts to bridge NSFS gaps with naval aviation and missiles alone. This study will demonstrate a credible case for re-examining major caliber guns and the ships that mount them as part of the NSFS solution set. This thesis identifies five courses of action to meet the NSFS requirements to defeat a future near-peer competitor in the littorals in a timely and affordable manner.

Keywords:

Naval Surface Fire Support, Naval Gunfire, Battleships, Amphibious, Forced Entry, Littoral Operations, Joint Fires, Joint Fire Support, Naval Fires, Fires, Fire Support, Artillery



JAWS Class 2006-2007 Award Winners

General Douglas MacArthur Foundation Thesis Award - Maj John M. Klein, USAF, “Eyes to See: The Foothold of Jihad Underpinnings”

National Defense University Foundation Thesis Award - COL Shawn A. Welch, USANG, “Joint and Interdependent Requirements: A Case Study in Solving the Naval Surface Fire Support Capabilities Gap”

OSD Office of Force Transformation Thesis Award - LCDR Thomas J. Stuhlreyer, USCG, “Maritime NORAD: Setting a Course for Success in Joint, Interagency, and Bi-National Maritime Homeland Security and Defense”

Association of the United States Army Thesis Award/JAWS Dean’s Writing Award – MAJ David W. Gardner, USA, “Clarifying Relationships Between Objectives, Effects and End States With Illustrations and Lessons from the Vietnam War”

Joint Forces Staff College Commandant’s Writing Award – Mr. Anthony K. Stapleton, DOS, “The Rule of Law and the U.S. Quest for Security in El Salvador”

Military Officers Association of America (MOAA) Excellence in Campaign Planning Award – Maj Jose H. Ocasio-Santiago, USA

Congratulations to the Award Recipients and thank you to those who assist in recognizing our students’ outstanding accomplishments.

Upcoming Events

23 July: First day of class for JAWS class of 2008

27-30 August: Gettysburg Campaign Staff Ride

5-9 November: Washington, D.C. Field Research

27-29 November: SOUTHCOM, SOCOM, CENTCOM visits

21 December – 1 January: Holiday Break



JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications

The following campaign planning publications are available from the Joint Advanced Warfighting Schools, Department of Operational Art and Campaigning.

CAMPAIGNING Journal

- Spring 2007 [pdf]
- Winter 2006 [pdf]
- Fall 2006 [pdf]
- Spring 2006 [pdf]
- Summer 2006 [pdf]

Joint Operation Planning Primer [pdf]

Case Studies

- Horatio Nelson and the 1798 Mediterranean Campaign [pdf]
- The Mexican American War [pdf]

War Plans

The following collection of war plans are from the Joint Forces Staff College Library. These are original World War II campaign plans have been scanned electronically to enable easy accessibility. Each campaign plan consists of a back ground introduction followed by the original plan in electronic format.

Introduction Reno IV Outline Plan [doc]

- RENO IV Outline Plan 6 March 1944 [pdf]

Introduction Mindoro Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO [doc]

- Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO 13 October 1944 [pdf]

Introduction to Tarakan Island Operations Instruction NO. 99 [doc]

- Operations Instruction NO. 99 Tarakan Island 21 March 1945 [pdf]

Introduction to Operation “ECLIPSE” [doc]

- Operation “ECLIPSE” Appreciation and Outline Plan 24 November 1944 [pdf]

Introduction Operation Blacklist [.doc]

- Operation Blacklist Basic Online Plan [pdf]



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